Trump, the Midterms, and Tehran: Eight Factors Shaping the Iran Conflict

As the United States approaches the midterm elections, Donald Trump’s administration appears unable to secure a military victory or a diplomatic resolution to the war with Iran. Should Republicans lose control of Congress, the administration would face a vastly different political environment for the remainder of Trump’s second term. Yet the trajectory of the conflict will not be determined solely in Washington—or Tehran.

To identify the factors most likely to push Iran toward war or peace, DW consulted three experts: Omid Memarian of DAWN, a Washington-based think tank dedicated to reforming U.S. Middle East policy; Finland-based political scientist Leila Morrovati; and Babak Rezaei Daryakenari of Leiden University in the Netherlands.

1. US Midterms: Will Trump Face Greater Scrutiny?

A Democratic victory would likely compel Trump to prioritize domestic issues and expose the war’s financial costs to Congress, according to Omid Memarian. Still, Trump could authorize limited strikes against Iran without a formal declaration of war.

Memarian predicts Trump will seek a “face-saving” exit following the election.

Memarian describes Tehran’s approach as a “big gamble with someone who does not behave like a conventional politician,” increasing the risk of renewed attacks.

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Babak Rezaei Daryakenari makes a similar argument: “The president has broad authority and freedom of action, particularly in foreign policy and military operations. Even a Republican defeat, coupled with greater congressional pressure, would not necessarily halt new attacks.”

2. Israel’s Political Deadlock Increases Pressure on Netanyahu

Israel’s October 27 election ended in deadlock. Neither the coalition backing incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor the camp supporting former IDF Chief Gadi Eisenkot secured an outright majority.

Memarian warns that political uncertainty could drive Netanyahu to take serious action while he still holds power, making the transition period the “most fragile and dangerous” window for renewed escalation.

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A change in Israeli leadership would not fundamentally alter Iran policy, Memarian says. Netanyahu’s main rival, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, “may be more deferential to America” and coordinate more closely with Washington. However, Trump’s relationships are personal, and Eisenkot “certainly won’t be like Netanyahu, who could sell any plan or scenario to Trump.”

Rezaei Daryakenari stresses that Israel’s security concerns regarding Iran “are not limited to Netanyahu himself.” A new government could alter the timing of a confrontation and its coordination with Washington, but the security establishment and ruling coalition would also shape the risk of an attack, he said.

3. Nuclear Impasse: Washington and Tehran Pursue Different Approaches

Iran’s nuclear program remains the most significant unresolved issue between Washington and Tehran, with the United States rejecting Iran’s claim that the program is solely for civilian purposes.

The two sides also disagree on how negotiations should be structured, according to Memarian.

“The United States wants negotiations to begin not only with a focus on Iran’s nuclear program but with concessions from the outset,” he said.

Iran, by contrast, demands sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets before nuclear talks begin. If the sides fail to move closer, Memarian warns, the likelihood of renewed war increases.

Until they agree on an agenda, he says, they are likely to keep “climbing the ladder of tension.”

Leila Morovati, a Finland-based political analyst, calls the nuclear program “the crux” of the standoff. Tehran views it as a survival guarantee and bargaining chip, she argues. Washington, in turn, fears that a nuclear-armed Iran would disrupt its security calculations and long-term regional strategy—hence its insistence on placing the issue at the top of the agenda.

4. Strait of Hormuz: Is Iran’s Leverage Also a Risk?

Before the Iran war began in late February, roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has since sharply reduced energy exports through the naval chokepoint, using it as leverage against the United States and Israel.

Memarian argues that Iranian restrictions in the strait would not, by themselves, trigger escalation.

If Washington determines that a broader attack is necessary to change Tehran’s calculations, any incident could serve as a pretext, he says. If U.S. officials judge the risks too high, they may opt for an economic blockade while keeping negotiations open. In that scenario, “even occasional tensions in the Strait of Hormuz won’t pull America into war,” according to the U.S.-based analyst.

5. Yemen’s Houthis: Iran’s Allies, Not Subordinates

Houthi rebels in Yemen have also targeted energy exports in the Red Sea, including attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure. However, Memarian notes that the rebels’ roots and struggle are “entirely domestic and organic,” despite their ideological alignment with Tehran.

Memarian says the Houthis make “pragmatic calculations,” and their actions do not necessarily signal an escalation between Iran and the United States.

Still, Washington could use Houthi actions as a pretext to strike Iran again.

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Rezaei Daryakenari offers a slightly different assessment. Houthi attacks on shipping and regional states, he says, “can both widen the war and accelerate coalition-building against the Islamic Republic.” Countries that wish to avoid war with Tehran “may turn to closer military cooperation to protect their trade and security.” This does not necessarily mean entering the war directly, he adds, “but it could narrow the Islamic Republic’s room for maneuver.”

6. Regional Mediators: Four Countries With Significant Interests

With direct talks between Iran and the United States stalled, attention has turned to Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Although each nation plays a distinct role in the crisis, all four have a direct stake in ending the war.

“They are close to the United States but also want to maintain ties with Iran and build regional alliances to prevent future conflicts,” Memarian says.

Morovati says Washington’s failure to support its Arab allies during the war could eventually push them to reconsider their policies and turn toward America’s rivals.

7. Trump’s Next Moves After the Election

During the campaign, President Trump said he expected a deal with Tehran soon after the midterm vote. Meanwhile, Reuters cited three senior Iranian officials and an additional source who said Tehran deliberately prolonged talks to weaken Trump politically.

Memarian says Iran’s leaders believe a Republican defeat would increase pressure on Trump to end the war. However, Trump will remain the primary foreign-policy decision-maker, and congressional pressure is unlikely to be decisive.

He says the present moment offers the “best opportunity” to end the standoff before Trump leaves office in January 2029.

“Iran’s leaders need to think about their endgame,” Memarian says, warning that Trump could launch a massive attack, inflict serious damage, and then declare victory.

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Daryakenari says “escalatory factors” will likely dominate in the coming months, making military escalation highly probable.

Tehran can only avert a new round of war through a fundamental policy shift and concessions that Iranian leaders would view as tantamount to surrender. However, he argues that such a retreat would also threaten the regime’s survival by undermining its ideological justification and eroding domestic support.

8. Economic Toll: Warring Parties Not Yet at Breaking Point

High oil prices, shipping risks, and economic strain are pressuring all sides as the war enters its ninth month. Could that drive Tehran, Washington, and regional capitals toward compromise?

“The economy is the Achilles’ heel of every party to this war—and that holds true even for countries beyond the region,” says Leila Morrovati.

She acknowledges energy prices as a source of pressure on the U.S. government.

“We’ve seen that energy supply and the expectations of the American public have been influential, and this is one of the problems the Trump administration faces,” she said.

At the same time, she warns that Arab states do not act as a unified bloc toward Tehran.

“If they come under severe security and economic pressure, they may take joint action, but so far that has not happened in practice,” she underlines.

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Memarian also views economic costs as an incentive for a deal. But he contends that each side believes inflicting more pain on the other will strengthen its position in future negotiations.

“That can easily turn this into a war of attrition, and in recent months that has been the approach,” he says. Neither side has yet reached the point where compromise appears unavoidable.

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