WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force forecasts a requirement for 1,509 combat‑ready fighter jets by 2035 to sustain a “moderate risk” operational posture, according to a senior officer and a newly released congressionally mandated report.
This figure marks a notable increase over last year’s estimates, reflecting significant upward revisions in the parallel low‑risk scenario as well.
The updated projections appear in the August 2026 report submitted to lawmakers as an unclassified supplement to a similar study issued the previous year. The analysis, covering fiscal year 2026, also revisits how combat‑ready fighters are counted, citing operational lessons from the war against Iran.
In addition to the moderate‑risk projection of 1,509 aircraft, this year’s fighter force structure report indicates that 1,723 combat‑ready aircraft would be required to achieve a low‑risk operational profile by 2035—several dozen more airframes than the 1,558 predicted just last year.
The moderate‑risk projection is likely the most relevant target, according to Air Force Lt. Gen. David Tabor, the deputy chief of staff for plans and programs. He said officials generally plan for a moderate level of risk rather than a low one, testifying to reporters at the Pentagon.
Tabor said the detailed fighter numbers in the report are intended to give the public, media, and Congress confidence that the Air Force’s planning is grounded in data. “We are looking at the long term, and we’re setting a chart to get there, and we can’t get there on our own,” he added.
He emphasized that exact figures are somewhat “debatable” because analyses are continuously updated, and it is unclear how much the moderate‑risk count of 1,509 represents an increase over last year’s projection, which did not include a medium‑risk figure.
Even as moving targets, the numbers are likely to confront congressional funding constraints. Historically, the service has struggled to secure procurement funding for fighters amid competing priorities such as nuclear modernization and budget battles on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers’ resistance to divestments also forces the Air Force to retain aging aircraft longer than planned, driving up maintenance costs.
“Without the TOA [total obligation authority], the money available, we’re not going to be able to do this,” Tabor said bluntly.
The Air Force’s FY27 budget reflects these challenges. The service has allocated funds for 24 F‑15EXs and an identical number of F‑35s in its base budget, while expecting an additional 14 F‑35s through a reconciliation bill that now faces uncertainty.
If reconciliation fails, Tabor indicated that shifting funds within the base budget could be considered, but stressed that such alternatives are less desirable. “The baseline premise is we need it all,” he noted.
Additionally, achieving a fleet of 1,509 aircraft depends on industry’s ability to deliver, a capability that is not guaranteed. The report cites modernization setbacks for the Lockheed Martin F‑35 and production difficulties for Boeing’s F‑15EX that have delayed deliveries.
Boeing said in a statement it is “working closely with the U.S. Air Force and Department of War to ramp up F‑15EX production, including investing across the production system and expanding team training to increase production capacity.”
A Lockheed spokesperson called the F‑35 “indispensable to global security,” noting over 1.2 million flight hours, more than 1,375 aircraft delivered, and operation by 13 nations. “With TR‑3 development completed in 2025, we’re advancing Block 4 modernization and are on pace to deliver 156 aircraft in 2026,” the statement added.
Tabor highlighted that multi‑year procurement negotiations for fighter aircraft are underway, which would provide a predictable demand signal for industry. “I personally think that yes, that is a good incentive for them to actually see the money into the future and not be beholden to this kind of erratic appropriation process,” he said. “It would be great if we can get on that path.”
A New F‑16?
The Air Force is also considering a new‑build F‑16 as a potential option to replace aging fleets, though a final decision is not “urgent” and could be made in the coming years. “It is something that we’re talking about, and so the way I describe it is that there is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F‑16s with,” Tabor explained.
The service has also moved to more than double the F‑15EX fleet and to extend the use of a limited number of A‑10 squadrons through the end of the decade. A‑10s have seen combat in the Middle East under Operation Epic Fury.
Air Force platforms, including several F‑15s, have been among the 81 airframes damaged or lost during the Iran conflict, according to a Congressional Research Service tally. The report notes that despite these losses, the service retains a total of 212 F‑15Es in various versions.
Tabor asserted that the revised analysis in the report was not driven by Epic Fury, as the work predated the conflict’s start. “The analysis takes some amount of time and to be fair, it should be something that we’re constantly looking at,” he said. “It really was just a refresh of the numbers and the combatant command requirements that they were articulating.”
Arithmetic Arguments
Although Tabor said the changes in aircraft figures were not driven by the Iran conflict, some of the report’s arguments for counting the fleet differ. The Air Force argues that its Combat Coded Total Aircraft Inventory (CC TAI) metric is “fundamentally more accurate” than Congress’s Preferred Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI).
Lawmakers have set a PMAI floor of 1,145 tactical aircraft, a requirement the Air Force currently does not meet. The CC TAI method adds backup and attrition reserve aircraft to the PMAI count, resulting in a larger inventory. Charts from the report illustrate the discrepancy.
The report contends that PMAI does not fully capture combat capacity because backup and attrition reserves are also needed in wartime, as demonstrated by Epic Fury. CC TAI is said to reflect the effects of peer conflict more accurately, accounting for sustainment challenges and losses experienced in intensive combat operations.
Tabor emphasized that CC TAI provides a clearer picture of “what I think Congress and, frankly, the American people care about, which is combat capability as opposed to the primary mission aircraft inventory.”
Critics of the CC TAI method argue that it can shortchange the Air Force because PMAI aircraft are funded at different rates than backup and attrition reserve jets, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.
The Air Force’s target of 1,509 jets by 2035 is measured using the CC TAI figure, and officials are still in discussions with Congress about potentially adopting the metric. “We’ve been having a lot of conversations with Congress about that language. I think that it’s a transition,” Tabor said.
