U.S. Drug Certification: A Law Enforcement Tool or Political Leverage?

The United States has removed Venezuela from its list of countries considered uncooperative on narcotics, while Colombia and Bolivia remain listed. What explains the shift? This analysis examines the latest designations, changing cocaine routes, regional politics, and the implications of Washington’s increasingly militarized approach to drug trafficking in Latin America.

Interview Transcript

Deborah Bonello: [00:00:04] Last week, the White House sent Congress its annual list of countries involved in the supply of illegal drugs and those that have failed to cooperate with the United States. The process is generally known as certification. The most significant change this year is that Venezuela has been removed from the list of countries deemed uncooperative. Colombia, Latin America’s largest cocaine producer, remains listed, as does Bolivia. Today, we examine the reasoning behind those decisions and what they reveal about criminal dynamics in the region, as well as the consequences of Venezuela’s removal. I’m Deborah Bonello, Managing Editor of InSight Crime, joined by our co-director Jeremy McDermott, who has lived in Colombia for 27 years.

Jeremy McDermott: [00:00:50] I’ve followed 27 of these White House designations, so, yes.

Deborah Bonello: [00:00:57] Can you explain what the presidential determination on major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries is, using its official name?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:01:09] The official name is “presidential determination on major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries.” The White House assesses countries through the lens of drug trafficking, and any country playing a significant role in moving or producing narcotics for the United States can be included. The determination contains two lists. The first, often called “the majors,” identifies major drug-transit or major illicit-drug-producing countries. Inclusion may reflect geography and other factors that make a country relevant to trafficking; it does not necessarily measure the government’s enforcement efforts. There are currently 23 countries on that list, 17 of them in Latin America and the Caribbean. The second list is more controversial. It covers countries that “failed demonstrably over the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” Those are the countries that are certified or decertified.

Deborah Bonello: [00:02:30] Right. The second list is the one that matters most. There are only four countries in the world on it: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, and Colombia. Venezuela was on it last year and had been there since 2005, so its removal is significant. What are the practical consequences of being listed?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:02:59] It has major international and practical consequences. It is a public criticism by the United States and has historically affected bilateral relations. More concretely, a country can lose U.S. assistance. American representatives at multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank, are required to vote against loan requests. However, the system includes a National Interest Waiver. If support is considered vital to U.S. national interests, assistance can continue. Three of the four countries on the list—the other three besides Afghanistan—have received that waiver: Burma, also known as Myanmar, Bolivia, and Colombia. They continue to receive U.S. aid.

Deborah Bonello: [00:04:06] So, in some ways, it is more of a symbolic statement about a country than a material measure?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:04:18] It can be more symbolic than material, but the distinction is not absolute. Losing aid would be serious, and the designation can be used as leverage to pressure governments to follow Washington’s preferred counternarcotics policy.

Why Did the United States Remove Venezuela?

Deborah Bonello: [00:04:36] Why is Venezuela being removed from the list for the first time in more than 20 years? Does that mean the United States no longer feels the need to apply pressure to Venezuela?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:04:47] The stated rationale is found in President Trump’s announcement: “Thanks to my administration’s arrest and removal of former illegitimate dictator and drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro and given the positive steps taken under interim President Delcy Rodríguez, I have determined that Venezuela should no longer be designated as having failed demonstrably.” The administration is therefore presenting its intervention and the change in Venezuelan leadership as evidence of progress.

Deborah Bonello: [00:05:28] That makes sense politically, but what concrete changes in Venezuela’s drug trade would need to be demonstrated for the designation to be reversed?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:05:45] Since Delcy Rodríguez took office, one notable event was the strike that killed the alias Niño Guerrero, the leader of the notorious Tren de Aragua prison gang. During President Trump’s campaign, Tren de Aragua was accused of staging an invasion of the United States and of operating as a drug trafficking organization, claims that have been disputed. The strike was a concrete development, but it may not have altered the broader drug-trafficking picture. Another issue was the Cartel of the Suns. It has managed drug trafficking through Venezuela for years. The central question is whether Maduro’s removal ended the cartel and the state-backed corruption that has enabled the cocaine business.

Deborah Bonello: [00:07:31] Maduro is now being tried under a new indictment in the United States, rather than the 2021 case in which he was accused of heading the Cartel of the Suns. The Trump administration also appears to have changed its description of the group, moving away from a vertically structured cartel and toward the view reflected in our research: that the Cartel of the Suns is an umbrella term for corruption embedded in the state, which facilitates cocaine trafficking. Has Rodríguez taken steps to dismantle that network?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:08:27] Let’s start with the 2020 indictment. We have long had concerns about its framing. It portrayed Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, and others as leaders of a vertically integrated drug trafficking organization, which was later designated a “narcoterrorist organization.” That designation was one of the justifications, as you noted, for the U.S. military intervention that removed Maduro. We have investigated the Cartel of the Suns since the organization was founded and have argued that it is not a vertically integrated cartel. It is what we call a system of hybrid criminal governance. Under Maduro, sanctions, hyperinflation, and economic mismanagement reduced the central government’s revenue and made it harder to maintain the loyalty of generals and senior Chavista politicians. Maduro responded by granting them criminal fiefdoms. Senior figures were posted to Colombia’s border, Caribbean smuggling corridors, or Bolívar state’s gold-producing areas, where they could draw criminal rents in addition to their official salaries. That system long predated Maduro and was rooted in military corruption and the cocaine trade. Under Maduro, it came to manage and regulate the business.

Deborah Bonello: [00:10:36] Before turning to Colombia, it would be remiss not to discuss the missile strikes in waters around Venezuela. They began around the start of September and have been unprecedented. They were carried out by Trump, not the Venezuelan Rodríguez administration. Have they reduced drug trafficking in and around Venezuela?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:11:19] They have affected the Caribbean coast and the use of go-fast vessels, which were the principal method used by traffickers leaving Venezuela’s northern coast. That route is reopening, but traffickers are relying less on go-fast boats and more on fishing vessels and other types of craft. Another significant change is a shift toward southern Venezuela and routes across Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, and northern Brazil. I am not convinced that the overall flow of cocaine through the country has fallen dramatically, but the routes and methods have clearly changed. That shift is the result of U.S. policy and the strikes, not action by the Venezuelan government.

The Political Dimension of U.S. Drug Certification

Deborah Bonello: [00:12:21] Let’s turn to Colombia, which was decertified last year and remains on the list. Given the arrival of conservative President Abelardo de la Espriella, a close ally of Trump who has emphasized renewed cooperation with Washington on counternarcotics, one might expect the designation to be reconsidered. What do you make of the decision to keep Colombia on the list?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:13:16] Colombia was first decertified last year, and this is the second consecutive designation. The decision was a shock in Colombia. The country sees itself as being on the front line of the fight against cocaine, in near-daily contact with illegal armed groups that control the trade. From the Colombian perspective, the United States remains the world’s largest drug-consuming market. That has created resentment, particularly among security forces. I think both designations are aimed more at the previous left-wing government of President Gustavo Petro than at Colombia’s actual efforts. The statement blames the country’s status on the “incompetence and chaos” produced by Petro’s administration, which ended in August when de la Espriella took office.

Jeremy McDermott: [00:14:23] There is also a personal dimension. President Trump clearly despised Petro. The two men are strikingly similar in some respects despite their opposing political positions: both rely heavily on social media, both are thin-skinned, and both enjoy confrontations. Colombia was not only decertified; Petro was personally targeted. He, his wife, and their children were placed on the Treasury Department’s OFAC list. That designation can freeze U.S.-linked assets, block financial transactions, and carry severe stigma. Trump paired the designation with insults, calling Petro a thug and accusing him of direct involvement in drug trafficking, for which there is no evidence. The statement does acknowledge de la Espriella’s election: “The people of Colombia made the courageous choice to elect a president who has pledged to lead an aggressive campaign against coca cultivation and cocaine production, which reached record levels under the failed socialist policies of his predecessor.” That is effectively an invitation: if de la Espriella delivers on his promises, Colombia may be removed next year.

Deborah Bonello: [00:16:07] This is not the first time Colombia has been decertified or that its president has been publicly condemned, is it?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:16:15] No. When I arrived, President Ernesto Samper was in office, and Colombia was decertified in 1996 and again in 1997. Samper was implicated in the Proceso 8,000 scandal, in which his campaign was accused of receiving millions of dollars from the Cali Cartel. Washington cited the failure to extradite the cartel’s leaders, who had been arrested in 1995, and the failure to put extradition before Congress, even though it was constitutionally prohibited at the time. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright accused Samper of undermining his own police and prosecutors by cooperating with the same criminals they were pursuing. The episode was plainly political: Samper’s U.S. visa was revoked, although he did not face sanctions as severe as those imposed on Petro. The pressure may have contributed to Colombia’s restoration of extradition at the end of 1997, a policy that has endured and remains central to the bilateral drug-enforcement relationship.

Deborah Bonello: [00:18:04] Trump’s message to Bolivia was similar to the one he sent to Colombia. He acknowledged the arrival of conservative President Rodrigo Paz, who took office in November after defeating a socialist government. How do you read that decision?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:18:28] The rhetoric is similar. The statement refers to “decades of inept socialist governments” and presents Paz’s presidency as an opportunity for “a new chapter” in U.S.-Bolivian relations. It also notes the March 2026 extradition of Sebastián Marset, an Uruguayan national who had operated substantially from Bolivia. Yet the statement says the new government has not had sufficient time to reduce coca cultivation. The implication is clear: if Paz can reduce coca cultivation, Bolivia may be removed from the list next year.

Deborah Bonello: [00:19:31] Several other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are mentioned in the president’s statement. What do those references mean?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:19:42] There are several. In order of importance, Washington first praises its allies: “I applaud three of America’s greatest allies in our hemisphere—Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador—for their leadership, resolve, and success in the fight against narcoterrorism.” Argentina is not even on the major-drug list, so this is a broad endorsement of friendly governments. Nicaragua is criticized, but not decertified: “the illegitimate Ortego-Murillo regime in Nicaragua has failed to take sufficient action against drug trafficking.” Peru receives a message similar to the one directed at Bolivia and Colombia. With Keiko Fujimori now president, the statement says it welcomes her commitment to working with the United States. Peru is on the major-drug list but is not decertified.

Jeremy McDermott: [00:20:59] The tone becomes more critical with Mexico and Canada. Washington acknowledges that President Sheinbaum’s administration has seized greater volumes of drugs, but says that “Mexico must take additional action against [the] narco terrorist organizations.” The Trump administration designated several Mexican groups as foreign terrorist organizations shortly after taking office. Canada, meanwhile, appears to have become another target for Trump’s criticism. The precise reason is unclear, although drugs enter through the Canada–United States border, one of the world’s longest and least intensively monitored borders.

Jeremy McDermott: [00:21:52] Brazil’s mention is also unusual. It is not on the major-drug list, although it is important to the cocaine pipeline to Europe. The statement accuses the Brazilian government of failing to confront the designated foreign terrorist organizations the First Capital Command and the Red Command, “which have transformed Brazil into a hub for global cocaine flows.” Brazil’s cocaine trade is primarily oriented toward Europe rather than the United States, so the relevance to U.S. drug policy is not obvious. One possible explanation is personal: President Lula has openly resisted Trump, pushed back on tariffs, clashed over rare-earth minerals, and refused to be bullied. The reference may therefore reflect political rivalry as much as narcotics policy.

Deborah Bonello: [00:23:10] So the process appears to be as political as it is law-enforcement-oriented. Has that always been true, or has it become more pronounced under Trump? The discussion is taking place against the backdrop of the Shield of the Americas alliance, which is being built across the region and is closely associated with Trump.

Jeremy McDermott: [00:23:40] It has always had a political dimension. The annual determination has given Washington a recurring opportunity to pressure leaders over counternarcotics policy. Under Trump, however, the politics are more explicit. The statement praises friendly governments, criticizes left-wing and socialist administrations, and signals that right-leaning leaders in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are expected to deliver results. Colombia and Bolivia may soon be removed if they comply. The language is also being used to advance Trump’s military-first agenda and the Shield of the Americas. Previous presidents have used the certification process to pressure governments since its inception, so politics has always been an important part of the mechanism.

What Comes Next for U.S. Drug Policy in Latin America

Deborah Bonello: [00:25:09] What should readers take from this year’s statement, and what do you expect next year?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:25:19] I expect Colombia to be removed from the list. Bolivia may also be removed if President Paz understands the request and achieves measurable reductions in coca cultivation through eradication. Venezuela is unlikely to change, because the current arrangement is politically convenient for the United States and Washington retains substantial influence over the Rodríguez administration. Looking beyond the politics, the key question is whether trafficking dynamics will change in the next 12 months. The current approach is built around the Shield of the Americas and a militarized response. Countries that join it, as most of the region now has, may be rewarded by avoiding Washington’s public criticism.

Jeremy McDermott: [00:26:58] We need to separate the politics and geopolitics from the question of whether this approach changes trafficking. We have concerns about the limits of a military-only strategy. Over the past 18 months, the main changes have been shifts in routes and methods, largely driven by strikes against go-fast boats. Cocaine prices in the United States may be at historic lows, while trafficking flows to Europe and the wider global cocaine economy continue to expand. So far, there has been no major transformation of the drug industry in the Western Hemisphere.

Deborah Bonello: [00:28:06] I am also interested in whether the Shield of the Americas will receive more specific definition. What will member governments be required to do? Will it include additional U.S. assistance? Could more details emerge by next year?

Jeremy McDermott: [00:28:37] I hope so. I would not speculate about what is happening inside the White House. We are waiting for announcements, and when they come, we will examine them in the same historical and regional context we use for other developments in the region.

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