The United States launched new strikes on vessels suspected of transporting drugs in late August—the first attacks after a two‑month hiatus. The latest missile strikes indicate that the Trump administration is persisting with a tactic that evidence shows has so far failed to curb drug trafficking.
President Trump has claimed that maritime drug trafficking to the United States plummeted after the strikes began in September 2025, even asserting a 98% drop by January. However, seizure data from the U.S. Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations tell a different story.
While drug seizures can serve as an imperfect proxy for the volume of narcotics moving through a region, cocaine seizures—the substance most likely aboard the targeted vessels—at U.S. ports of entry fell by less than 3% over the eleven months following the start of the strikes compared with the same period a year earlier. Moreover, a typical supply shortage would drive prices up, yet cocaine prices in the United States have remained largely stable, undermining the claim that supply has been reduced.
There is evidence that the strikes have disrupted certain routes, pushing smugglers to adopt alternative paths or methods, but they have not led to a substantial reduction in overall drug trafficking.
Initially, traffickers abandoned coastal drug‑export points in Venezuela after the strikes, and shipments to nearby islands such as Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad virtually ceased for a time, according to InSight Crime investigations. However, seizures near Aruba in June and July show that these routes are being used again. Alternatives have also emerged, with reports of increased drug flights from Venezuela into Guyana following the onset of strikes in the Caribbean Sea near Venezuela.
Recent drug confiscations in or near Guyana’s neighbor Suriname suggest that routes departing these countries may be becoming more entrenched. Traffickers are also turning to larger vessels and hugging coastlines to lower the risk of attack, DEA analysts told the Washington Post.
The most recent strikes indicate that the controversial campaign will continue, regardless of its dubious impact.
Lethal strikes on August 23 and 25 were followed by a joint operation with Ecuador on August 28, during which U.S. Marines and sailors sank what the military described as a floating refueling station used by the Ecuadorian criminal group the Choneros to fuel drug‑laden vessels. Unlike earlier offshore strikes, this time U.S. forces removed the crew before destroying the vessel.
U.S. authorities have not provided evidence to support their claim that the boats and individuals targeted in the strikes— which have resulted in 227 deaths since September 2025—were engaged in drug trafficking. The planning process remains opaque; Senator Tim Kaine disclosed in June that the presence of drugs aboard a vessel is not among the three criteria used to select targets. A Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) report has questioned the intelligence behind the strikes, citing insufficient rigor in identifying those on board or their alleged ties to drug‑trafficking organizations.
The strikes are part of a broader U.S.-led anti‑drug effort in the region. The Coast Guard continues to make large seizures, the Treasury has imposed aggressive sanctions on suspected traffickers, and the State Department has designated 20 criminal groups in the area as Foreign Terrorist Organizations since last year. The latest maritime missile strikes occurred a few weeks after the most recent meeting of the U.S.-led Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C), also known as the Shield of the Americas alliance—an initiative championed by the Trump administration to promote a more militarized anti‑drug strategy across the region.
