During his upcoming meeting at the White House on Tuesday, Iraq’s newly appointed Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al‑Zaidi is expected to address several contentious issues, chief among them the involvement of Iran‑aligned paramilitary groups within the country.
The paramilitary forces, collectively known as the Popular Mobilization Front (PMF), were originally assembled in 2014 to combat the Islamic State at the behest of religious authorities. Today they comprise roughly 240,000 combatants and operate on an annual budget of approximately $3.5 billion (€3 billion).
While not every PMF faction is listed among Iran’s so‑called Axis of Resistance—which also encompasses Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza—some units have been linked to attacks on U.S. installations in Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan.
This explains why Washington is pushing for the disarmament of these groups.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio addressed the issue while in the United Arab Emirates last month.
“You can’t have the end of hostilities and conflicts in the region as long as Iranian proxies are launching missiles and drones from Iraq and are participating in terrorism,” Rubio told reporters.
Pressuring Iraq, withholding oil revenues
In recent months Washington has intensified pressure on Baghdad, designating additional PMF factions as foreign terrorist organizations, sanctioning entities linked to the groups, threatening to restrict Iraq’s oil revenue streams through U.S. financial institutions, and withholding foreign currency transfers.
Baghdad has replied that, by the end of September, all weapons must be placed under state authority, and any factions that refuse will face prosecution.
In late May, influential cleric Muqtada al‑Sadr ordered his Saraya al‑Salam militia to surrender its arms to the government; a week later, officials announced receipt of data on personnel, weapons, and equipment.
Early June saw two additional Iraqi militias—Asaib al‑Ahl al‑Haq and Kataib Imam Ali—declare the termination of their formal links to the PMF, with intentions to transfer weapons and personnel to state control.
However, as swiftly as these declarations emerged, skepticism surfaced.
AAH, active since 2006, was notorious for attacks on U.S. forces following the 2003 invasion and, even after most American troops withdrew, retained a reputation for criminal conduct—including theft, violence, kidnappings, and murder. The group and its proxies, sometimes operating under alternative names, have also been accused of targeting U.S. installations and allied entities within Iraq amid the broader U.S.–Iran confrontation.
The pledge to disarm, according to sources close to the PMF, translates to “shifting what you hold in your right hand to your left,” as reported by the London‑based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al‑Awsat.
Analysts observed that ceding weapons to the state is logical given that these groups already exert de‑facto governance, and some have labeled the move a “rebranding” effort.
Many PMF factions also hold parliamentary seats, collectively commanding a majority in Iraq’s legislature.
Should such a process materialize, monitoring disarmament will prove challenging, al‑Nidawi, director of programs at the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center, told DW.
While some of this criticism is warranted, noted Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at the Washington‑based Century International think tank.
Conversely, Jiyad observed that AAH has been evolving for some time, leveraging its political successes to prioritize governance over resistance agendas.
Nonetheless, AAH was not the PMF faction most closely aligned with Iran; groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, which maintain stronger ties to Tehran, have pledged to retain their weapons and continue resistance activities, and lacks a political wing, according to Jiyad.
This may explain why factions like AAH, operating within Iran‑aligned networks, can afford certain concessions, as suggested by both Jiyad and al‑Nidawi.
Iran requires influence and operational leverage in Iraq, Nidawi explains. This entails mobilizing individuals who can channel weapons to other Iranian allies, manage commercial fronts and launder funds, and conduct attacks against Iran’s regional adversaries. AAH’s actions do not signify a severance from Tehran; rather, they reflect a strategic redistribution of assets—e.g., whether three operatives focus on combat while five engage in business, or six fight and two operate commercially.
Consequently, Jiyad argues, these developments are unlikely to fulfill Washington’s objective of neutralizing the threat posed by Iran’s Iraqi allies.
Unless lasting stability and peace are secured across the region, the risk of anti‑U.S. actions emanating from Iraq will persist, even if certain groups dissolve or shift focus to politics, Jiyad concluded. A pro‑Iran sentiment remains entrenched among many Iraqi factions and a substantial portion of the population.
Thus, are there any positive implications stemming from militia pledges to disarm?
In certain respects, such pledges and the emergence of a more political and civic‑oriented militia could herald a less confrontational future, al‑Nidawi contends.
However, he cautions, this trajectory still binds Iraq within Iran’s sphere of influence, albeit in a manner potentially more acceptable to the United States, while wholly sidestepping accountability for prior atrocities—including mass murder, ethnic cleansing, forced disappearances, and terrorism—committed by these groups, a stance that is difficult to accept.
Edited by: Jess Smee
Iranian Kurds in Iraq Navigate War‑Induced Fear and Exile
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