Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – The signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 was intended to bring an end to two years of devastating conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
The accord stipulated a permanent end to hostilities, the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of Tigrayan combatants, as well as political dialogue and the repatriation of displaced civilians. Article 7 further demanded that the TPLF cease all conscription, training, deployment, and mobilisation of military forces, and abandon any preparations for renewed hostilities.
Nearly four years on, the large‑scale fighting has ceased, yet the underlying disputes that sparked the conflict remain largely unresolved.
More notably, since 2024 the TPLF has re‑established itself politically and organizationally, while preserving its military capacity and forging new alliances.
The pattern is striking: contacts between the TPLF and Eritrean officials—reported meetings in Dubai and Zalambessa; a renewed contest for political authority in Tigray; accounts of recruitment and mobilisation; fresh clashes involving Tigrayan troops; and the rise of Tsimdo, an informal coalition of factions opposed to the federal government.
Together, these developments raise questions about whether Pretoria functioned more as a pause for the TPLF to regroup and reposition itself than as a definitive transition to lasting peace, with the root conflict still unresolved.
No evidence suggests the TPLF entered the agreement with a pre‑planned strategy to use it as a tactical interlude. Nonetheless, events since 2024 indicate that the movement has maintained an organisational and security function that the accord was intended to curtail.
What happened to disarmament?
Article 6 set out the mechanism for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of TPLF fighters. Following the agreement, Tigrayan forces surrendered heavy weaponry, and thousands of former combatants entered demobilisation programmes.
However, the process did not fully dismantle the region’s military structures.
In 2026, reports surfaced of renewed recruitment and forced mobilisation in Tigray. Should these allegations be verified, they would exceed the incomplete implementation of the DDR process and directly contravene Article 7’s prohibition on conscription and mobilisation.
The distinction between organised mobilisation and the sentiments of Tigray’s civilian population remains crucial.
There is no reason to assume that the entirety of Tigray’s population supports a return to war; many continue to endure the fallout of the previous conflict.
![The Pretoria peace deal ended Ethiopia’s Tigray war but left political and territorial disputes unresolved, as the TPLF has sought to reassert its influence and build new strategic relationships [Getty Images]]()
A civilian source in Tigray, speaking to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said: “The people of Tigray desire peace; we do not want a second war.”
For those civilians, reports of recruitment carry a straightforward implication: the prospect of being drawn back into a conflict they believed had ended.
How did the TPLF reposition itself?
The transformation extended beyond the military sphere.
From 2024 onward, the TPLF became increasingly embroiled in an internal struggle over its post‑war direction. Internal meetings and political maneuvering were part of a broader contest over the movement’s future.
The struggle ultimately extended to Tigray’s political institutions.
Getachew Reda was ousted as head of the interim administration in 2025, succeeded by Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede.
In May 2026, the Tigray regional council was re‑established and elected Debretsion Gebremichael as president, bolstering the position of his faction.
These developments underscored the TPLF’s continued political clout in Tigray. Rather than a stable post‑war order taking shape, the region found itself again enmeshed in a struggle for authority, while the security dilemma persisted.
When did politics turn back into fighting?
By early 2026, political tensions were accompanied by military developments on the ground.
In January, Tigray Defence Forces (TDF)‑aligned troops crossed the Tekeze River into the contested Tselemt district and clashed with Ethiopian federal forces. Subsequently, TDF‑aligned fighters seized control of Alamata and Korem after a federal command post withdrew.
By August, hostilities erupted once more in western Tigray near the Sudanese border, marking another serious violation of the peace accord.
Both the federal government and the TPLF blamed each other for the escalation, with responsibility for the outbreak of fighting remaining contested.
Nonetheless, the renewed fighting demonstrated that organised armed forces retained the ability to mobilise and contest territory.
Consequently, the incomplete disarmament has become more consequential as the unresolved political disputes left by Pretoria have begun to coincide with renewed military activity.
Why are former enemies finding common ground?
The realignment has extended beyond Tigray.
Eritrea and the TPLF were locked in a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000, and Eritrean forces later fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal government against the TPLF during the 2020‑22 Tigray conflict.
Yet the post‑Pretoria period has seen reports of closer contacts between Eritrea and elements of the TPLF.
Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting the TPLF and using it as a proxy, a claim Eritrea denies.
A broader realignment is reflected in the emergence of Tsimdo, an informal convergence of groups opposed to the federal government.
Recent reporting has identified cooperation between the TPLF, Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and other armed groups. Fano leader Zemene Kassie has confirmed the existence of such a coalition while stating that Eritrea is not currently part of it.
The significance of Tsimdo lies not merely in whether its members share a common political programme, but in what they appear willing to set aside to cooperate.
Major disputes remain unresolved: displaced persons have yet to return to contested areas such as Welkait, while territorial claims continue to divide Tigray and Amhara stakeholders.
Nonetheless, groups that once fought on opposing sides now appear willing to set aside some of those differences when cooperation can intensify pressure on the federal government.
That raises further questions about the TPLF’s post‑Pretoria strategy. The organisation appears to be rebuilding its political influence while maintaining ties to military structures, even as many Tigrayans remain displaced and fear renewed mobilisation.
The emerging convergence points to a potentially widening gap between the strategic calculations of political and armed actors and the immediate interests of civilians still grappling with the consequences of war.
These groups have distinct histories and political ambitions, and their cooperation may not endure. However, their willingness to find common ground against Addis Ababa is significant.
For the TPLF, Tsimdo offers another arena in which to cultivate political and strategic relationships beyond Tigray.
What did Pretoria leave unresolved?
The war displaced roughly 1.9 million people. Many remain unable to return, especially to disputed areas such as Welkait, Tsegede, Humera and Raya.
These territorial disputes remain closely linked to the return of displaced Tigrayans, while the political relationship between Tigray and the federal government remains unsettled.
The federal government has also failed to deliver on key elements of the post‑war settlement. Nonetheless, those failures do not absolve the TPLF of its commitments under Pretoria.
Article 6 envisioned the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of its fighters. Article 7 prohibited conscription, mobilisation and preparations for renewed conflict.
The record since 2024 does not prove that the TPLF deliberately used Pretoria to buy time.
It does, however, show a movement that has remained politically organised, strove to regain control of Tigray’s institutions, retained links to armed structures and found new potential partners as the settlement stalled.
Pretoria ended the large‑scale war. It did not resolve the underlying struggle over power, territory and security.
For Tigrayans, however, the calculations are simpler.
A young man from Tigray, speaking to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said: “The fear of being drafted is causing many youths to lose hope.”
Also Read
- Twin Explosions at Bolivian Military Arsenal Near La Paz Leave Multiple Dead, Dozens Injured
- German Far-Right Surges, in Threat to Postwar Taboo on Extremists in Power
- Malaysia declares emergency in Sarawak as haze from Indonesia worsens
- White House conducts review of potential successors to Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg amid Pentagon leadership churn