Deep-sea mining is emerging as a critical maritime security issue, extending beyond environmental and economic concerns, according to African nations taking a proactive stance on the matter.
Malawi, Kenya and Madagascar have taken the lead among African countries, joining 40 other nations at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa in June to endorse a precautionary pause on deep-sea mining (DSM) in international waters—covering 64% of the Earth’s ocean surface.
The international seabed area, lying beyond any country’s jurisdiction, serves crucial functions including biodiversity support, nutrient cycling and carbon sequestration, all vital to Earth’s climate balance.
Despite ocean covering 70% of Earth’s surface, less than 30% of the seafloor has been mapped, and humans have explored less than 0.001% of the deep ocean floor—an area smaller than Cairo.
None of this has deterred states and corporations from exploiting this fragile marine environment, which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) designates as the ‘common heritage of humankind.’ This designation means the seabed should be managed for humanity’s benefit and cannot be monopolized by powerful states—it can only be used for peaceful purposes.
DSM has been positioned as essential to the green energy transition, with metals like copper, cobalt, manganese and nickel used in batteries and renewables extracted from deep-sea nodules located 4,000 to 6,000 meters below the surface. However, emerging evidence suggests a circular economy built on recycling and material design could meet these needs without initiating a new extractive race.
As justifications for DSM shift continuously, the industry increasingly represents an emerging security challenge. Africa will be significantly affected and must help shape global governance before major powers turn the seabed into a geopolitical battleground.
Investigative reporting has revealed that eight Chinese state-owned vessels conducting deep-sea research spent less than 10% of their time in designated International Seabed Authority (ISA) exploration areas. These vessels, with direct links to the Chinese Navy and regular ports calls at military facilities, navigated predominantly military-sensitive waters around Guam, Taiwan and other strategic regions with their tracking systems disabled.
This activity enables the collection of critical military intelligence, including mapping submarine routes and refining anti-submarine warfare capabilities, potentially predicting rival submarine locations and identifying vulnerable undersea infrastructure like the cables carrying over 95% of global internet traffic.
Such developments blur the line between commercial deep-sea mining and military reconnaissance, raising concerns that the race for the deep seabed coincides with competition for undersea military dominance. DSM risks becoming both a surveillance tool and a primary theater for great power competition.
In April 2025, a U.S. executive order directed rapid, unilateral seabed exploitation outside ISA oversight, aiming to counter China’s influence over seabed resources for national security reasons.
DSM’s security implications threaten the multilateral governance system Africa helped build. Africa’s sea lanes already experience intensified foreign naval deployments, bases and ports. Iran’s recent ballistic missile strike on the U.S.-U.K. military base on Diego Garcia island—targeting areas near Mauritius and East Africa—demonstrated the continent’s vulnerability in global conflicts.
Neither the ISA nor existing African maritime frameworks were designed to address DSM’s potential covert military applications, creating significant regulatory gaps. While global DSM discussions focus on environmental and economic issues, security risks remain largely unexamined, giving major powers and industry players considerable latitude with minimal oversight.
Africa has compelling reasons to assert its voice on DSM, particularly from a security standpoint. The priority must be confronting dual-use risks—when commercial vessels serve military purposes. The ISA Secretariat aims to finalize mining regulations by 2026, making immediate African action critical.
African nations should propose a formal agenda item and dedicated workstream at the 27-31 July ISA Assembly addressing deep-sea security implications. The group should advocate for mandatory disclosure of military connections to contractors and research vessels.
This should include independent research examining how military use of DSM vessels conflicts with the obligation to use the seabed solely for peaceful purposes—no exploitation should proceed until such assessments are complete.
The African Union and African Group at the ISA must initiate a continental review of DSM’s economic risks for African terrestrial mineral exporters and coastal states. They should coordinate an African position incorporating legal, development, climate and security perspectives.
This position should rest on a precautionary pause—legally deferring exploitation until scientific certainty ensures no marine environmental harm and until equity, governance and security questions are resolved.
With 47 African states as UNCLOS parties, the continent’s benefit-sharing and common-heritage principles stem partly from contributions by developing nations, many of them African. Africa possesses influence—the question is whether it has the capacity to wield it effectively.
David Willima, Researcher, Climate Risk and Human Security, ISS Pretoria
