Azerbaijan’s School Hijab Ban Tests Limits of ‘Brotherly’ Ties with Turkey

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a longtime champion of Muslim rights, has remained conspicuously silent regarding Azerbaijan’s recent ban on hijabs in schools. For years, Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have cultivated a close alliance, yet the prohibition has placed the Turkish leader in a delicate diplomatic bind.

School uniform regulations introduced in September in predominantly Muslim, officially secular Azerbaijan have been enforced to bar pupils wearing the headscarf. Teachers have also reported facing exclusion. While the rules do not explicitly name the hijab, they prohibit attire deemed incompatible with school uniforms or the principles of secular education.

Turkish social media has been flooded with footage of Azerbaijani children in hijabs pleading for entry to their classrooms, igniting outrage among Turkey’s religious conservatives. Despite his history as a vocal defender of Muslim rights domestically and internationally, Erdogan has refrained from public comment.

“He is unusually muted because Azerbaijan and Turkey have enjoyed an extremely strong relationship,” said Turkish political analyst Sezin Oney. “If it were another country, he would have had a harsher reaction.”

Baku’s Response

Erdogan, who rose to political prominence in the 1990s by challenging a similar ban in Turkish universities, built a global reputation as an advocate for Muslim rights. Oney predicts his silence on Azerbaijan will tarnish that standing.

“It is a far cry from the days when Erdogan could stand up to the powerful of the world,” Oney added. “That was the image he projected, and now he cannot even stand up to Aliyev.”

Aliyev has publicly dismissed criticism from one of Erdogan’s advisors, while Baku has issued international arrest warrants for several prominent Turkish Islamist and conservative figures and barred others from entry over similar critiques. Azerbaijani officials accuse these critics of threatening the country’s sovereignty and national security.

Shifting Status

Aliyev and Erdogan have maintained close ties for over two decades, underpinned by economic and defense cooperation and the mantra of “two states, one nation.”

“Erdogan and Turkey still see Azerbaijan as a little brother,” explains Tbilisi-based defence and security expert Eugene Kogan. “That is not the perspective from Baku, which insists the relationship is no longer between a big brother and a little brother, but one of equals.”

Kogan noted that Ankara has not fully embraced this shift to parity, creating strain in bilateral relations. Energy-rich Azerbaijan is growing in economic stature compared to Turkey’s struggling economy and ranks among Turkey’s largest foreign investors.

Earlier this month, the two nations signed arms agreements exceeding $500 million. Azerbaijan’s state oil company, SOCAR, reports investments of roughly $19.5 billion in Turkey.

“SOCAR is the flagship of investments in Turkey—it is massive,” said Turkish analyst Atilla Yesilada of Global Source Investments. “Turkey has a chronic deficit in plastics and petrochemicals. There are plans for a $10 billion petrochemical complex in the Adana or Antalya region, and domestic capital lacks that funding. If Turkey wants to address its petrochemical deficit, it needs SOCAR involved.”

Relations with Israel

Azerbaijan’s deepening ties with Israel, despite Turkey’s condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza and broader regional tensions, present another friction point with Ankara.

International media reported this month that Azerbaijan signed a $235 million arms deal with Israel’s Elbit Systems, though neither side has confirmed the reports. Azerbaijan also remains a key oil supplier to Israel, with crude piped through Turkey and shipped from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. In 2024, Erdogan moved swiftly to suppress protests against these exports—demonstrations led largely by religious conservatives who form a core pillar of his support base.

However, Kogan believes Israel will not seek to exploit any rift between Baku and Ankara. “The stability of relations between Ankara, Baku, and Tel Aviv is very, very important for Tel Aviv,” he said.

Last year, Baku hosted talks between Turkey and Israel aimed at defusing tensions over Syria. “Israel understands that it could come to war with Turkey, and Baku can still act as a meeting point for both countries. I cannot think of another viable meeting point between Ankara and Tel Aviv at the moment,” Kogan said.

With Turkey serving as the primary export route for Azerbaijan’s oil and gas, mutual dependency remains a powerful check on escalating tensions.

Gasimov suggests the current rift represents a learning process. “I wouldn’t read it as a reshuffling or rebalancing, but rather as a new chapter that may have opened up, provided the two sides learn from it and are ready to accept these kinds of differences.”

As Turkey grapples with mounting financial and economic challenges, Erdogan is expected to seek ways to smooth relations with his affluent neighbour. The full impact of this dispute on their alliance, however, remains to be seen.

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