[BOSNIA CONDUCTS ELECTIONS USING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, BUT DEEP‑ROOTED POLITICS PERSIST]
Bosnia and Herzegovina held its presidential election on October 4, employing new biometric systems designed to prevent votes from being cast for deceased or missing citizens.
Among the longstanding issues was the practice of voting on behalf of individuals who had died or migrated abroad, a tactic that had plagued previous elections.
Turnout remained historically low—just over 40%—largely because the older methods of fraud had been dismantled.
Earlier contests sparked recurring accusations that ballots were submitted for dead people, duplicate votes were recorded, or empty ballots were inserted after polls closed to inflate participation rates.
The voter registry, filled with names of those who had passed away or left the country, provided the raw material for these manipulations.
New technology, same old politics
This election marked the first time that every polling station employed biometric fingerprint verification.
For the first time ever, the elections in Bosnia were transparent thanks to this measurement.
Nevertheless, the most significant story is political rather than technical. The three major nationalist parties each secured victories along ethnic lines: the SNSD won among Serbs, the SDA among Bosniaks, and the HDZ BiH among Croats.
Even though the dead may have been removed from the electoral rolls, the underlying political dynamics have not shifted.
For readers unfamiliar with Bosnia’s structure, the 1995 Dayton Agreement divided the nation into two entities—Republika Srpska, where Serbs are the majority, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dominated by Bosniaks and Croats.
A three‑member presidency administers the state, with each ethnic group electing its own representative.
That system ensures that these elections are seldom determined by economics or daily concerns; instead, they reflect which group is perceived as a threat from the other side.
Republika Srpska and the Return of a Fallen Leader
For Milorad Dodik, the most influential Serb politician in Bosnia, this election represented a political resurrection.
In 2025, Dodik was barred from public office for six years following his conviction for defying the high representative—the chief international official overseeing the 1995 peace process.
Although the United States placed sanctions on him in 2022 (later lifted late last year), his party, the SNSD, dominated Republika Srpska’s parliamentary seats.
Savo Minić became president of Republika Srpssa, and Zelja Cvijanović retained the Serb seat in the presidency. Both belonged to the SNSD.
The party’s performance in the entity’s parliament was near‑total triumph; neither the sanctions nor Dodik’s conviction adversely affected its outcomes. In these contests, voters were not selecting individuals but supporting “sides” within an entrenched ethnic framework.
Dodik moved quickly to outline a future course of action.
He proclaimed a return to what he called the “original Dayton” agreement, which in practice means reverting many of the powers the state had expanded since 1995—from the judiciary to the military—back to the republics under Serbian leadership.
“That means we are returning the army to Republika Srpska, the border police, the intelligence service, and everything the high representatives once stripped away,” stated Dodik.
A Deal Between Serbs and Croats?
The opposition offered little meaningful resistance; it was fragmented and lacked a compelling narrative.
Voters without sympathy for Dodik found few alternatives, leading most to abstain. The low turnout favored whichever camp possessed the most organized party machinery.
This dynamic raises a question that will shape Bosnia’s trajectory in the coming year. Although Dodik was barred from directly competing, reports suggest a backchannel negotiation involving the HDZ BiH leadership and the convicted incumbent.
Should representations from the SNSD and the HDZ BiH join the presidency, a compromise could pardon him regardless of the third member’s decision. Bosnian media have hinted at a pre‑election arrangement between Dodik and HDZ BiH leader Dragan Cvitic. Should that fall through, Dodik could eventually serve again as prime minister of Republika Srpska—a role he previously held.
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Troika Defeated
The situation in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina differs, but the ultimate outcome mirrors the national result.
The “Troika,” a multi‑ethnic liberal coalition that governed the federation prior to recent changes, suffered a defeat.
It came to power after the international high representative—unrelated and authoritative—altered the election legislation.
Electors showed no advantage in embracing this legal experiment. The SDA, the largest Bosniak nationalist bloc, captured the highest number of seats and performed strongly.
The apparent contradiction is striking: despite the electoral win, Bakir Izetbegović—the SDA president—and son of Bosnia’s founding leader, did not secure the presidential contingent. Instead, Denis Becirovic—a Social Democrat—won the Bosniak seat and preserved the position.
Thus, the party achieved its parliamentary objective, yet its leader was excluded from the institution crafted by the Dayton accords.
“The future of our region lies not in adopting the Russian model but the European one. Help Bosnia. Let the will of the people be the law of the land,” declared Becirovic while proclaiming victory.
A Croat Surprise
The same pattern repeated for the Corin. Darijana Filipović of the HDZ BiH, the movement’s staunch nationalist faction, prevailed in the Croat presidium seat.
Filipović spent years serving as aides to Covic, the dominant Croat leader.
“HDZ BiH proved courageous enough to pursue a path other groups would not dare. Few dared to nominate me, and to some even younger candidates—as a surprise to everyone,” she remarked after the vote.
Three distinct peoples, three nationalist movements, three wins, and still no substantive debate about preserving the nation’s cohesion.
What This Means for the State
The most crucial aspect of these elections is not the statistics themselves but the composition of the presidency. Two women will occupy the dual offices: Cvijanović of the SNSD and Filipović of the HDZ BiH. Anyone attempting to frame this as progress for gender equality has missed the fundamental significance.
Both hail from parties that, in varying degrees, seek structural changes to the current state apparatus. Each could also influence the resolution of serious disciplinary disputes regarding a convicted individual who violated the Dayton peace oversight mechanisms.
The HDZ BiH has long championed the creation of a third Croat entity. The SNSD pursues greater autonomy for Republika Srpska. On either side stands the common aspiration to diminish the unitary character of the state.
Consequently, the presidency—which ought to epitomize a shared civic identity—is once more populated by figures who regard the institution as a guest place rather than a legitimate governing body.
These developments unfold simultaneously with the Western Balkans emerging as a theater for competition between Moscow, Brussels, and Washington. Dodik publicly saluted both Putin and Trump following his party’s triumph.
Bosnia enters a new electoral chapter defined by cutting‑edge technology coexisting with entrenched political hostility. Younger generations continue to emigrove en masse, and while the deceased no longer participate in the ballot, the living increasingly doubt whether transformation is possible.
Edited by: Aingeal Flanagan
