In 2025, Jennifer Kavanaugh and Christopher McCallion authored “Armed Neutrality for Ukraine Is NATO’s Least Poor Option,” arguing that armed neutrality offered a wiser path for both Ukraine and NATO than full membership. A year later, we invited them to revisit their position. Image: Midjourney
In their 2025 article, Kavanaugh and McCallion contended that NATO membership and binding U.S. or European security guarantees for Ukraine were effectively unworkable, and that armed neutrality was the option best suited to protecting both Ukraine’s security and NATO’s credibility. As the debate has shifted to include proposals for “Article 5-like” assurances short of formal membership, has the trajectory moved toward or away from the armed neutrality outcome they described?
It is true that “Article 5-like” assurances have been floated, but it remains unclear what this concept actually entails and whether any such proposals will amount to anything concrete. First, NATO’s Article 5 commitment is unique. It is not simply about treaty language but also about deep institutional cooperation and integration. A commitment to Ukraine outside of NATO would lack this institutional weight and would be fundamentally different from Article 5 in practice.
Second, the way the Trump administration has described hypothetical promises to Ukraine — to the extent it has discussed this issue at all — suggests that any commitment would originate from Europe’s Coalition of the Willing, possibly with U.S. logistical support. Since the Coalition of the Willing itself is a loose concept that currently has no clear mandate or allocated forces, it is uncertain what, if anything, is actually being offered to Ukraine. President Donald Trump has also wavered on whether the United States would commit to providing any kind of backstop.
More importantly, it has been months since there has been any mention of these assurances, in part because even before negotiations stalled, no one seemed satisfied with them.