China Is Worried About Russia’s Growing Ties With North Korea

TOPSHOT – In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, (L‑R) Russia’s President Vladimir Putin walks with China’s President Xi Jinping and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un before a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and the end of World War II, in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on September 3, 2025. (Photo by Alexander KAZAKOV / POOL / AFP via Getty Images)

POOL/AFP via Getty Images

President Vladimir Putin faces mounting pressures as the war drains Russia roughly $290 billion annually. Troop losses exceed 30,000 men each month, and Russian forces are increasingly stalled—or even retreating—in key sectors. The public bears the brunt of these costs, exemplified by Ukrainian drones striking a St. Petersburg oil terminal and adjacent ports earlier this year. Additionally, Russia raised value‑added taxes to 22 % in late 2025, causing food prices to climb 18 % during 2026.

Facing severe depletion, Putin is turning to North Korea for military reinforcement—a nation among the world’s poorest. According to South Korea’s Defence Intelligence Agency, Pyongyang has contributed over 16,000 troops since October 2024 and delivered more than 15 million artillery rounds. In addition, Pyongyang has supplied Russia with numerous KN‑23 and KN‑24 missiles.

Ukraine has indicated that up to an additional 50 000 North Korean soldiers might eventually join the frontlines, a claim that Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo‑Jong, labeled “completely groundless”.

How is this deepening alliance viewed in Beijing? In the last 18 months, Russian and North Korean officials have held 23 high‑level meetings, sharply exceeding the 8 such encounters between China and North Korea.

Beijing grows wary of the Russian‑North Korean alliance

Anxiety directs Beijing to fear that intensifying Russian‑North Korean collaboration may heighten regional instability and tarnish China’s international standing. Leaders such as Xi Jinping warn that strengthening the Putin‑Kim relationship could diminish Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang. Official and scholarly Chinese voices stress that China shows little appetite for a comprehensive trilateral military pact linking China, North Korea and Russia. Although recognizing that expanded Russian‑North Korean cooperation presses the United States and other Western partners, China rejects formalizing such a framework to safeguard its own strategic priorities.

In truth, the Russian‑North Korean bond is largely transactional. North Korea has dispatched forces where Moscow required them, yet the partnership lacks genuine reciprocity. Although Pyongyang was one of the few states to acknowledge Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, expecting concrete economic returns, such promises proved illusory. Trade has stayed modest—reaching merely $42 million in 2020—and North Korea ranked roughly 139th among Russia’s top 100 trade partners.

Today North Korea generates roughly $7.7 billion to $14.4 billion annually from selling weapons and stationing its fighters in the Kremlin’s territory. Moscow has also supplied advanced technologies, including submarine reactor designs, air‑defence installations and multiple‑role drone systems. Building on Russian assistance, Pyongyang now has access to autonomously piloted, jet‑propelled combat drones.

Beijing fears that these acquisitions will empower North Korea, further destabilising the region. Leveraging Russian expertise, Pyongyang’s nuclear programmes and space capabilities are expanding rapidly, reinforcing Kim Jong Un’s authoritarian drive.

China is also concerned that as North Korea becomes more powerful and assertive due its closer ties with Russia, its provocations and miscalculations could push Washington, Seoul and Tokyo toward tighter security coordination, potentially spurring Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear armaments. Moreover, China wishes to avoid a regional flare‑up along the Yalu River—its border with North Korea—that might generate massive displacement crises.

China’s difficult relationship with North Korea

Historically, relations between China and North Korea have been marked by rivalry, suspicion and cynicism rather than reciprocal respect. Beijing seeks stability for the peninsula, but welcomes powerlessness rather than strength. Even the most favorable assessment of Pyongyang is often framed as that of a reluctant “little brother” lacking genuine agency.

This comes at a time when the domestic sentiment runs the opposite way. Online platforms show visible antipathy toward North Korea, epitomized by disparaging titles such as “Fatty Kim the Third,” which regulators forced underground. Surveys reveal widespread disdain for Pyongyang across cyber forums.

Contrastingly, Chinese audiences display staunch backing for Russia amid the Ukraine conflict, with headlines urging victory for Moscow. State media paints Putin as a sage and protector, while still celebrating Russian soldiers as heroic defenders of the homeland. This positive framing contrasts sharply with the near‑hostility reserved for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

While the Kremlin enjoys a pragmatic affinity with Pyongyang, sentiment among Russians remains lukewarm; only about a third of the population now regards North Korea as a true companion, up from just three percent in 2021 according to the Levada Center.

For Beijing, this rapid integration poses greater obstacles than advantages. By fortifying its military pact with Russia, Pyongyang erodes strategic levers over the DPRK, while simultaneously presenting a volatile neighbour whose actions could destabilise the periphery. Thus, what looks like a tactical advantage to Moscow becomes a diplomatic liability for China.

Source link