Polls show Democrats holding an eight‑point advantage in both the House of Representatives and the Senate ahead of the United States midterm elections, positioning them for a possible majority. Analysts say a Democratic victory would not fundamentally alter Europe’s own electoral landscape, but it could trigger two notable side‑effects.
Beyond a likely thaw in transatlantic relations, experts highlight two potential adverse impacts. First, a Democratic Congress might foster complacency among Europeans toward rising far‑right movements on the continent. Second, it could prompt former President Donald Trump to increase pressure on Ukraine to conclude an undesirable deal with Russia.
“If the Democrats win the House, let alone both houses, it will be read as, ‘you see democracies bounce back,’” said Catherine Fieschi, a nonresident scholar at Carnegie Europe specializing in European far‑right politics. She added that such an outcome would convey “the idea that these things don’t mean the advent of a fascist regime.”
From Paris, Fieschi envisions a Democratic win sparking debate over whether to fear a Marine Le Pen presidency as strongly as some warn, or to view it as part of a cyclical democratic correction: “If people are really bad and really incompetent, then elections right the way,” she noted. Polls currently place Le Pen at roughly 34 percent ahead of France’s presidential election on April 18.
A 2025 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) survey illustrates the complacency risk. After Trump’s first six months, clear majorities in Western Europe deemed the US political system broken, while Eastern Europeans—skewed toward right‑wing voters—believed it was functioning well.
Greek Migration Minister Thanos Plevris cautioned against attributing European policy shifts solely to US actions. He argues that European public opinion hardened on asylum and economic migration independently, though the US amplified the change through aggressive measures such as military deportation flights and armed ICE operations in American cities.
“I think there was a European about‑turn on migration. We saw this in Germany, which had a welcoming attitude [to refugees] for many years, and they went to a more controlled policy. All northern European governments saw societies change,” Plevris told Al Jazeera. “But the US provided a change in tone, from induction and integration and benefaction to deterrence, border protection, increased returns and consequences if asylum is denied. I do think that pivot played a role in Europe,” he added.
The fallout for Ukraine
Should French voters conclude that electing Le Pen is “like some kind of strong medicine that would wake us up to what we might lose,” as Fieschi described, they would confront three controversial proposals: cutting French contributions to the EU budget, reducing military aid to Ukraine, and possibly abandoning the euro for a devalued franc. Any of these steps would dealt a major blow to the European project, which now hinges on trade, monetary union, and security.
A reduction in assistance to Ukraine would remove about 3.5 percent of its foreign military aid, according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, forcing other allies to fill the gap.
At the same time, Fieschi warned, “we could end up in a situation where Trump is basically clinching deals with Putin as fast as he can,” referencing a US‑Russian strategy to coerce Ukraine into a peace agreement that would sacrifice its eastern Donbas region—an outcome Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called a strategic error likely to reignite war and that most Ukrainians oppose.
Trump has already used US early‑warning systems and Starlink satellite navigation as leverage against Ukraine and has twice echoed Russian calls for Zelenskyy’s replacement.
This heightened pressure from the White House could be compounded by Russia intensifying its “all‑domain war” against European nations, a campaign many EU governments believe is already underway, according to Victoria Vdovychenko, a Ukraine expert at Cambridge University’s Centre for Geopolitics.
“Cognitive warfare never stopped on the European continent, and Russians are already using existing vulnerabilities to the utmost,” she told Al Jazeera. “I hope that the European partners will be staying very strong.”
What Europeans think
Trump’s withdrawal from the post‑World‑War II world order, his disregard for democratic norms, and his perceived betrayal of Ukraine have already shifted European public sentiment, analysts note.
Only 31 percent of Europeans now view the US as Europe’s “most trustworthy ally,” down from 51 percent in 2024 when Joe Biden was president, according to a poll conducted for the German think tank Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Seventy‑three percent of Europeans across all age groups say the continent should “go its own way” rather than maintain close US cooperation—a figure that rose from 63 percent in 2024 and includes a clear majority among centre‑right and right‑leaning respondents.
The Spring Eurobarometer, a regular European Commission survey, found that 68 percent of respondents want the EU to play a stronger role in shielding Europeans from global crises and security risks, while 39 percent consider this a top priority.
A June poll for the European Council on Foreign Relations recorded a steep decline in the US being described as an “ally,” dropping from 22 percent in November 2024 to just 11 percent across Eastern and Western Europe.
Similarly, a Pew Research Center survey of 36 countries—nine of which are EU members—showed 76 percent expressed no confidence in Trump, with 57 percent holding unfavorable views of the US.
These anti‑US and anti‑Republican sentiments, forged over two Trump administrations, would likely be difficult to reverse after a single congressional election, particularly while Russia’s war continues to affect Europe.