In 2025, Joel Wuthnow published “How China Could Counter U.S. Intervention in War Over Taiwan,” arguing that Beijing’s most attractive option in a conflict over Taiwan might not be striking U.S. forces first, but rather keeping the United States out of the fight altogether by threatening the American homeland. A year and a half later, we asked him to revisit that argument in light of subsequent military developments.
Wuthnow’s assessment has held up remarkably well. It is clear that Beijing continues to prioritize ways to deter U.S. intervention and intimidate American allies. The Department of Defense’s reports on Chinese military developments have highlighted several key advancements that strengthen Beijing’s strategic deterrent. These include fielding long-range DF-27 conventional missiles, moving toward a launch-on-warning nuclear posture, and expanding silo fields in western China. Expanding and diversifying these strategic capabilities allows Beijing to conduct nuclear signaling during a crisis, raising the risks of any U.S. intervention triggering inadvertent escalation with a nuclear-armed rival.
Beyond paper assessments, China has made highly visible displays of these strategic capabilities. At the September 2025 military parade in Beijing, China showcased a number of new deterrent systems, such as the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile, and the DF-61 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. In combination, these capabilities represent the legs of a new triad focused directly on Washington. Other notable signaling included a test-launch of an intercontinental-range submarine-launched missile in July 2026, as well as a growing number of joint bomber patrols with Russia. These actions collectively underscore a sustained and deliberate campaign to keep the United States on the sidelines in any future cross-strait crisis.

