Ecuador Confronts Deepening Criminal Crisis: Shifts from Hard Power to Holistic Solutions

Why Ecuador Is Losing Its Fight Against Organized Crime

Ecuador’s militarized anti-criminal strategy has struggled to curb rising violence. After three years of aggressive operations under President Daniel Noboa’s administration, recorded homicides reached historic peaks, placing the country among Latin America’s most deadly nations. While minor improvements have occurred recently, projections indicate the country could face another devastating year, reversing decades of stability. This article examines how the former regional safe haven transformed into a severe security crisis and evaluates the government’s shifting approach between limited reform and continued reliance on foreign security models.

The escalation of cocaine trafficking, entrenched corruption, fractured gang structures, and declining prison oversight have collectively pushed Ecuador into profound instability, prompting decisive government actions.

President Noboa formally declared an “internal armed conflict,” designating twenty-two criminal organizations as terrorist entities in January 2024. This move followed high-profile escapes by leaders of the Tijueños, Choneros, Lobos, and Chone Killers, including the abduction of journalists during a television broadcast and the releasefrom custody of José Adolfo Macías, known as “Fito,” leader of the Choneros group.

See Also: The Tiguerones: US Terrorist Designation Meets a Fracturing Gang in Ecuador

Subsequent U.S. governments have responded by labeling the Choneros, Tijueños, Lobos, and Chone Killers as foreign terrorist organizations. President Noboa has actively aligned with the Trump Administration, defending defensive strikes on drug-trading vessels at sea and coordinating a joint operation with American forces on domestic territory alleged to host illicit activity—which local observers and subsequent reporting clarified was a cattle and dairy farm.

Short-Lived Victories

Initial security pressures yielded several high-profile convictions. Notable arrests included the capture of Fito in June 2025, followed by his extradition to the United States months later, the apprehension of Lobos leader Wilmer Chavarría, nicknamed “Pipo,” in Spain during November 2025, and the detention of Tijueños chief William Joffre Alcívar Bautista, called “Willy,” in October 2024. Though Willy was briefly held in Spanish custody before being released in late 2025 due to concerns about incarceration conditions within Ecuadorian facilities, these successes have not translated into systemic victory.

Instead of consolidating gains, Ecuador witnessed further fragmentation within once-unity criminal networks. The disintegration of the Choneros triggered internal power struggles among the Tijueños, Lobos, and Tijueños factions. Repeated leadership assassinations and capitals of senior operatives have intensified infighting across remaining criminal organizations.

See Also: Choneros’ Extraditions to the United States Will Test Ecuador’s Kingpin Strategy

Security priorities shifted decisively toward prison modernization and enhanced inmate protection. In January 2024, the president ordered the military to assume internal security duties within correctional institutions, and by November 2025, hundreds of inmates had been transferred to El Encuentro, a newly constructed maximum-security facility. However, prison violence persists, with confirmed fatalities within facilities surpassing combined totals across previous two years.

During July 2026, Noboa introduced an updated security framework that refines the existing hard-power methodology by committing to address socio-economic drivers of criminality through reduced youth unemployment and improved educational retention rates.

Further details on the criminal challenges confronting Ecuadorian authorities can be found in our comprehensive and revised Ecuador profile.

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