An analysis of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war and peace policies, as challenged by his October 27 election opponents, is not new: he has failed to implement diplomatic and strategic changes to enhance Israel’s security, effectively squandering significant tactical military victories. This critique forms the basis of Gadi Eisenkot, who has led in recent polls for prime minister. While Eisenkot initially advocates maintaining security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria—aligning with Netanyahu and former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett—his broader vision introduces distinctive strategies for Israel’s security and diplomatic posture.
Eisenkot’s Nuclear Containment Strategy for Iran
Eisenkot proposes a novel approach to addressing Iran’s nuclear program: advocating for the US to establish a monitored “kill zone” around the limited sites where Iran’s 60% enriched uranium remains stored. Unlike former President Trump’s theoretical discussions of surveilling these sites, Eisenkot would publicly commit to immediate air strikes against any unauthorized movement of nuclear materials. This strategy would necessitate sustained US aerial presence in the region, reminiscent of 1990s operations over Iraq. His objective is to ensure irreversible pressure on Iran, complementing diplomatic efforts to permanently dismantle its nuclear capabilities through extended, verifiable inspections. While IDF operations in June 2025 temporarily curbed Iran’s program, the existence of this enriched uranium stockpile remains a unresolved threat. Eisenkot rejects “bad deals” that merely defer the nuclear danger, emphasizing that such containment measures are essential even if negotiations achieve partial success.
The nuclear threat is only one facet of Iran’s broader security challenges. Since April 2024, the Islamic regime has targeted Israel and multiple regional states with ballistic missiles, including attacks on Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, and Qatar. Eisenkot acknowledges his role in fortifying Israel’s air defenses during his tenure as IDF chief, though the 2025 Iranian retaliation occurred years later. He recognizes the narrower scope for countering missile threats compared to nuclear ones, particularly given Trump’s dismissal of the missile danger as comparable to Saudi capabilities. To address this, Eisenkot plans to expand Mossad operations beyond nuclear facilities to target Iran’s missile infrastructure, employing both covert intelligence and disruptive actions.
Syrian Leadership and Strategic Buffer Zones
Eisenkot maintains skepticism toward Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s alleged reform, viewing him as a jihadist aligned with extremist ideology. Like Netanyahu and Bennett, he opposes rapid withdrawal from Syria’s buffer zones, arguing such territories provide leverage for future diplomatic negotiations. He advocates a targeted approach based on the 1974 ceasefire precedent: retaining key strategic locations like Mount Hermon while negotiating phased Syrian military withdrawals near the border. This strategy aims to balance resource conservation with enhanced security, reducing Israel’s occupation footprint without compromising defensive capabilities. Eisenkot also seeks to limit Russian and Turkish influence in Syria, potentially drawing al-Sharaa into US-aligned spheres through strategic engagement. A key proposal involves permitting limited Turkish presence in northern Syria while blocking radars and air defenses near Israel, preserving Israeli air operations. He further calls for expanding United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) involvement, potentially under US leadership, to ensure effective peacekeeping. Additionally, Eisenkot prioritizes protecting Syria’s Druze community from sectarian violence, leveraging Israel’s shared religious ties with the Druze to justify intervention if necessary.
Gaza Policy and Palestinian Governance
Eisenkot accuses Netanyahu of maintaining Hamas’s control over Gaza despite military operations eliminating over 25,000 Hamas fighters. He criticizes Netanyahu’s blocking of alternatives like the Palestinian Authority or a Trump-backed technocratic government. While blaming Hamas for slow disarmament progress, Eisenkot also holds Netanyahu accountable for insufficient diplomatic pressure. Supporting a West Bank-based governance model like Bennett, he rejects the Palestinian Authority as Hamas, deeming it the lesser of two evils. Eisenkot would endorse partial disarmament-linked rebuilding measures, diverging from Netanyahu’s “poison pill” approach. He argues that partial deals could weaken Hamas and rehabilitate Israel’s international image, contingent on Netanyahu’s removal from power to restore global credibility.
Rehabilitating US-Israel Relations
Eisenkot’s foreign policy aims to reframe Israel as a vital US ally, emphasizing its role in neutralizing regional nuclear threats. He seeks to remind Americans of Israel’s contributions to countering ISIS and mitigating risks from Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Highlighting bipartisan US consensus against Middle Eastern nuclear proliferation, he will argue that Israel’s security directly serves American interests. Eisenkot attributes declining US-Israel ties to Netanyahu’s governance style, including controversial coalition figures and weakening democratic institutions. By adopting a more collaborative international posture, he believes Israel can regain Western solidarity and address its damaged global reputation. He advocates engaging constructively with European partners, even critics, to foster reconciliation and strategic alignment.
Lebanon and Regional Diplomacy
Eisenkot proposes restoring French involvement in Lebanon alongside US military advisors to strengthen the Lebanese army. While sharing Netanyahu’s skepticism about Lebanese military readiness, he supports an eight-kilometer security zone to prevent Hezbollah missile deployments, citing military efficacy over political symbolism. To counter deeper infiltration, he seeks stronger US-French cooperation to pressure Lebanon into confronting Hezbollah. Eisenkot also prioritizes revitalizing relations with European allies—France, Britain, Germany, Italy—recognizing their contributions to missile defense against Iran. Despite anticipating resistance from anti-Israel nations like Spain and Ireland, he advocates engagement to normalize ties. Acknowledging stalled Saudi normalization, he attributes this to ideological divides post-Gaza, urging continued efforts with Egypt, Jordan, and Gulf states to counter Iranian influence.
Addressing West Bank Tensions
Eisenkot identifies West Bank policy differences with Netanyahu, accusing him of enabling extremist violence through appointments like Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and Shin Bet Director David Zini. He pledges to reverse policies fostering settler violence, including restoring police powers to prosecute Jewish attackers and nullifying Smotrich’s illegal farm expansions. Eisenkot intends replacing Zini with a leadership committed to tackling Jewish extremism, even if it breaches standard term limits. He will reinstate administrative detention for violators, arguing it deters attacks. While acknowledging initial implementation delays, he aims to stabilize security policies within months, contingent on electoral outcomes.
The author writes in The War Room: The Inside Story of Israel’s Fight Against Hamas and the Iranian Axis, among several other books. He is the Post’s senior military analyst and an expert on Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon.
