Good morning. As the UN general assembly convenes in New York, attention is expected to center on the escalating conflicts in Iran, Ukraine and the Gulf — as well as the body language of Andy Burnham’s first in-person meeting with Donald Trump.
Yet another pressing concern is set to dominate private conversations: the rising tide of sabotage across European states that is widely attributed to Russia yet deliberately calibrated to fall short of triggering a military response. This so-called hybrid or “shadow war” is designed with a singular objective — to erode support for Ukraine.
As Vladimir Putin solidifies his hold on power through tightly controlled elections and the Kremlin celebrated the strong showing of the far-right AfD in German state elections, European intelligence officers have shared with the Guardian their most grave warnings to date about the prospect of Russian aggression on European soil.
For today’s briefing, I spoke to Shaun Walker, our special correspondent for eastern Europe, Ukraine and intelligence matters, about whether Europe is already at war. Below, a deeper look at the issues he has been investigating.
In depth: The line between peace and war
In a series of interviews with Shaun Walker in Prague and Riga, intelligence chiefs from the Czech Republic, Latvia and Sweden raised the alarming possibility of an imminent Russian test of Nato, with one suggesting an attack could materialise within “months, not years.”
These warnings came days after Polish prime minister Donald Tusk informed parliament that intelligence assessments indicated Russia might deploy drones or missiles against Nato territory in the coming months. French president Emmanuel Macron has also convened an emergency meeting of party leaders to discuss similar intelligence.
When I caught up with Shaun in a taxi en route to Warsaw airport, he was still gauging the gravity of these warnings. “One thing you always have to bear in mind when reporting on intelligence is that — because the way spy agencies gain information usually remains secret — you often don’t know if a source is talking about a very specific intercept of a plan that’s almost certainly going to happen, or if it’s less concrete chatter that analysts have pieced together.”
He noted that these concerns do not reach the level of early 2022, when American intelligence repeatedly and with hard evidence warned that Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine.
What struck him most was his sources’ willingness to be named: “Normally I go into these interviews assuming we’re going to talk off the record. All of these people were happy to be on the record, which strongly suggests they want to get a message out.”
He also offered a clarifying note on journalistic conventions: “Off the record” is a phrase often misused. In essence, on the record means you can attribute information directly to a named source. Off the record allows you to use the information to inform your investigation, but you must not reveal its origin. You can then corroborate with other sources and write: “Several sources with knowledge of the matter confirmed…” It is a journalistic convention with no legal force.
What is this hybrid war and how can Europe fight it?
This systematic campaign has grown steadily since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four and a half years ago. Its hallmarks are consistent: sowing chaos and anxiety among Ukraine’s allies, while making it frequently impossible to prove Russian involvement conclusively, as Kremlin security services pivot to recruiting local operatives online.
Since the start of this year, a catalogue of unexplained fires has struck defence facilities supplying Ukraine in Italy, Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovakia. An explosives-laden drone was discovered beside a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig airport in Germany. Danish authorities warned that Russia is recruiting Danish citizens to sabotage defence firms with ties to Ukraine; in Lithuania, an Ikea was set ablaze; and in France, five coffins inscribed with “French soldiers in Ukraine” were left beneath the Eiffel Tower. In the UK, the Rycroft review found that online disinformation from hostile foreign states, including Russia, was distorting political discourse when it was published in March, while two Russian-linked arsonists who targeted property connected to former prime minister Sir Keir Starmer were jailed in June.
Given the escalation, Shaun observes that some EU politicians are growing irritated with the term “hybrid war,” arguing that such direct attacks amount to more than mere “grey zone” activity.
Although European governments have become quicker to publicly attribute blame to Russia, the challenge lies in deciding on effective measures. After the Leipzig incident, Germany expelled more than 150 Russian diplomats and promised tighter border controls — but the Schengen free-movement zone complicates enforcement, as one suspect in the Leipzig plot reportedly entered Europe on an Italian tourist visa.
EU sanctions already blacklist Russian banks, energy companies and entities in the United Arab Emirates, Thailand and China for helping Moscow evade western restrictions. There is also a growing willingness among EU nations to crack down on Russia’s shadow fleet — vessels illegally transporting Russian oil and other goods in the Baltic and North seas.
While critics argue these diplomatic and economic measures fall short, others worry that stronger action risks pulling the bloc into military escalation. As Shaun puts it: “What Russia is working to is that they know even the most hawkish people in Nato countries would really like to avoid having a direct conflict.”
What is the mood in Europe?
For decades, politicians and analysts in the Baltic states most exposed to Russian aggression have urged western Europe to take the threat more seriously. That mood has shifted of late, with Jonatan Vseviov, secretary general of Estonia’s foreign ministry, cautioning against “panic” on social media.
These states remain the strongest advocates for tangible responses to Russian aggression, but are acutely aware that the bulk of Russia’s military capability is committed in Ukraine. They also fear the societal and economic impact of narratives depicting tanks rolling into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — which is, of course, partly the intent of concerted Russian psyops.
“Someone put it to me recently — which I thought was the perfect description — that Baltic states prefer western Europe to see it as a chronic rather than an acute problem.”
With that in mind, European leaders gathering at the UN this week will be eager to present a united front and wary of interventions from Donald Trump, who has dismissed concerns that Russia might strike a Baltic country or other member state to test Nato resolve, and has repeatedly criticised the alliance.
Is Europe already at war — and what does that mean?
When Shaun was researching his latest book, The Illegals, about Russia’s deep-cover spies, he sifted through archives of KGB documents from the 70s and 80s. They frequently referenced “the special period,” a Soviet term describing a stage between friendly coexistence and war, characterised by plans for relentless sabotage.
“It sounded a lot like where we are now,” he says. Like Europe, Russia does not want a direct confrontation with the West, but “their risk appetite is increasing,” Shaun adds.
The scale of sabotage has prompted prominent military voices in the UK and across Europe to suggest the bloc is already at war — though the very definition of “at war” has become liminary — and that governments should be more transparent with their publics. Does Shaun agree?
His one-word answer is “no.” The nuance is as follows: “There is a clear campaign from Russia, using methods that are not military but are pretty aggressive. Some people may consider them something close to war. It’s clearly absolutely nothing like the war in Ukraine.”
He suggests European governments find themselves in a domestic bind. “If they choose to spend on defence rather than social issues, those social issues get worse and voters move to the populist right — the AfD in Germany or Le Pen in France — and you end up with leaders very sympathetic to Russia in power.”
“There’s a careful path between dismissing this as a fake threat and the kind of alarmist rhetoric that we’re on the path to war and every other issue is secondary.”
