F-35 Readiness Crisis Threatens U.S. Stealth Advantage in Potential Taiwan Conflict

A growing paradox threatens U.S. airpower: the F-35 Lightning II is the cornerstone of any potential conflict over Taiwan, yet the fleet is increasingly unable to fight. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report reveals that persistent supply-chain bottlenecks and flawed contractor oversight have driven the jet’s full mission-capable rate to just 25%, a sharp decline from 38% in fiscal year 2021. The broader fleet mission-capable rate has fallen from 67% to 44% over the same period.

In response, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) launched the Global Support Solution (GSS) Reset, a sustainment overhaul requiring an additional $13.7 billion through 2031. However, investigators warn that private-sector capacity limits on critical components and a projected annual funding gap exceeding $1 billion by the mid-2030s severely threaten readiness goals. The GAO also found the JPO consistently mismanaged performance incentives, paying Lockheed Martin millions in fees for metrics misaligned with actual military readiness requirements. The Department of Defense has concurred with recommendations to implement formal risk-mitigation plans and restructure future sustainment contracts.

The stakes extend far beyond maintenance statistics. An August 2025 Department of the Air Force report identifies the F-35 as the foundation of the future fighter force, with its advanced suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capability deemed critical for combat success. While the F-22 Raptor remains a potent air-superiority platform, production ended in 2011, leaving only 187 irreplaceable airframes. No other U.S. fighter combines the F-35’s stealth, multirole versatility, and production scalability.

These readiness shortfalls are intensifying as China rapidly expands its fighter production infrastructure. Writing in the April 2026 issue of Air & Space Forces Magazine, J. Michael Dahm reports that the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) is building capacity to produce 300 fourth- and fifth-generation fighters annually. Chengdu Aircraft Corporation now operates five J-20 production lines, outputting 100–120 stealth jets per year after adding 4.3 million square feet of manufacturing space. Meanwhile, Shenyang Aircraft Corporation has added 500,000 square feet for J-15, J-16, and initial J-35 batches, and is constructing a new 4-million-square-foot facility with a 12,000-foot runway. These expansions total over 8 million square feet—eclipsing Lockheed Martin’s entire Fort Worth F-35 complex. Dahm projects the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will surpass the combined fighter inventories of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps by 2028, fielding the world’s largest fighter force by 2029.

The core dilemma remains: the aircraft best suited to penetrate China’s defenses is the one least available to do so. In a Taiwan contingency, U.S. forces would confront a dense, layered air-defense network. A March 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute report by Lonnie Henley details how Chinese coastal defenses integrate Russian S-400 systems (400-km range) and S-300PMU variants (200-km range) with domestic HQ-9B missiles (300-km range). This overlapping umbrella could isolate contested airspace, threaten allied airlift, and subject Taiwanese airfields to sustained bombardment.

Under such conditions, only stealth platforms—F-35s, F-22s, B-21 Raiders, B-2 Spirits, and low-observable drones like the RQ-170 and RQ-180—could operate inside the engagement zone to conduct SEAD missions. Legacy fourth-generation fighters such as the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 would be restricted to the periphery, employing long-range munitions cued by stealthy sensor platforms. Emerging “loyal wingman” drones are unlikely to close the gap soon. A June 2025 Belfer Center report by Brian Moscioni notes that while AI can manage low-level flight, high-level cognitive tasks—target prioritization and engagement strategy—still require human judgment. Operational adoption remains constrained by processing latency, software reliability, ethical concerns, and a persistent trust deficit.

The F-35’s struggles reflect a broader tactical aviation readiness crisis. A September 2025 Mitchell Institute report by John Venable and Joshua Baker finds chronic spare-parts underfunding has pushed the average mission-capable rate across the U.S. fighter inventory to just 59%. Despite DoD directives targeting 80% combat readiness, the combined availability of the F-16, F-22, and F-35 fleets has never exceeded 70%. This logistical gridlock leaves only 354 combat-coded F-15E, F-16, and F-35 strike assets immediately available for peer conflict.

China’s quantitative gains are significant but not without vulnerabilities. A May 2026 China Aerospace Studies Institute report notes the PLA Air Force now fields roughly 2,400 combat aircraft, including 15 brigades of J-20s. However, the force still relies on imported Russian engines and component designs, while sweeping anti-corruption purges and procurement disruptions across the defense industrial base threaten high-end modernization timelines.

Ultimately, the U.S. challenge in a Taiwan scenario may hinge less on developing advanced capabilities than on keeping them operational. In a conflict where stealth aircraft could decide control of the skies, the decisive question may not be how many F-35s the United States owns, but how many are mission-ready when hostilities commence.

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