Has Pakistan closed its own leverage?

The Cost of Closing Torkham: How Pakistan’s Leverage on Afghanistan Is Backfiring

A closed border serves as a stark warning, until the other side simply stops listening. For decades, Torkham has functioned as the economic backbone of the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Islamabad utilized it as a powerful bargaining chip against Kabul. The closure of Torkham and other crossings does not stem from a tariff or customs dispute but from a single demand: action against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan’s stance has remained consistent. Kabul insists it does not shelter the TTP, denies them space, and insists on shifting rhetoric into tangible, on-the-ground action.

This closure tests whether Pakistan is punishing terrorism or trade, and whether Islamabad is containing Kabul or asserting its own influence over it. The outcome is proving damaging to both sides, with structural losses falling heavily on Islamabad and a shift in the trade map rather than a change in the terrorism landscape. Earlier this month, an exchange of fire near Angoor Adda in South Waziristan was followed by a temporary shutdown at Torkham, which reopened only after both sides’ intermediaries intervened. Pakistan’s military spokesperson stated that the Afghan Taliban “won’t be able to bear the cost” of harboring terrorists.

The situation remains volatile. Torkham stays shut to trade, with no change in behavior and no change in demands. With little progress toward its goals, the impact on trade demonstrates that the strategy is backfiring. For Afghan traders, Torkham was more than a transit point; it was familiar and even familial. The closure forces a difficult learning curve, and one cannot simply close a border on an Afghan and expect business to follow.

World Bank data from June 2026 showed that 48 percent of Afghan imports passed through Central Asia and 46 percent through Iran, with virtually none proceeding through Pakistan. A former trader who previously used Torkham is now channeling cargo through Iran or Uzbekistan, identifying new banking channels and drivers. Those who learn the new routes will find it difficult to revert to the old path.

Pakistan cannot punish the TTP by punishing trade.

-Naila Mahsud

While this does not unlock new trade volumes—coal exports to Pakistan have almost vanished—the fabric is shifting elsewhere. In June 2026, Afghanistan’s textile exports reached $21.5 million, a 304 percent increase from the previous year. Though modest, this demonstrates the principle: closing Torkham does not create a dead end, especially when alternatives exist.

Torkham’s closure was intended to force Afghanistan to reflect. Instead, it has compelled Islamabad to reflect on the costs of harsh measures in a world where traders possess other options, even if only temporarily.

Official figures from the Pakistan Trade Development Authority reported by Dawn indicate that Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan fell by 74 percent, from $1.391 billion in 2024-25 to $358 million in 2025-26. This represents a significant loss for Islamabad.

Pharmaceuticals are the most visible casualty. Pakistan’s total medicine exports dropped by 30 percent, from $457.46 million to $319.01 million. Factory owners in Lahore manufacturing medicine for Afghanistan, among flour mills in Peshawar and cement shops in Quetta, report fewer customers.

Fedro Pharmaceuticals in Peshawar, which previously packaged roughly 70 percent of its medicines for Afghanistan and Central Asia, was left with unfilled orders and expired packaging in Persian and Russian that had to be discarded, according to CNA. MM Ellahi Traders, which once exported rice, meat, citrus, and potatoes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, has seen their share of revenue plummet to 5 percent.

Even Pakistan’s plan to redirect trade to Central Asia has become considerably costlier. One exporter told CNA that shipping through Torkham to Uzbekistan previously took a week for $2,000 to $3,000. Routing via Iran now costs $10,000 to $13,000, spanning nearly six weeks and traversing Balochistan, where security threats are elevated. At these expenses and paces, Pakistani goods struggle to compete.

The dynamic is simple: if you are angry at a customer and shut your own shop, you do not punish the customer; you teach him to search for alternatives.

Leverage only functions if a border remains open most of the time and closed only occasionally. Prolonged closure erodes deterrence; customers cease to trust the link and seek other routes. True leverage requires three conditions to be met: the other side has no viable alternative, Islamabad can absorb the loss longer than the adversary can, and Islamabad must be prepared to sacrifice that business permanently.

The numbers suggest a different reality: while Afghanistan suffered more in relation to its reliance on Pakistan for food and medicine, Pakistan has incurred deeper structural losses—its customer base, its status as a gateway, and its leverage as Afghanistan’s primary route to the sea.

By maintaining Torkham’s closure for such a long period, Islamabad is not enhancing its leverage. Instead, it is dismantling the very trade link that originally provided leverage. Citizens are punished, not terrorists.

Now that both parties understand the real cost, new talks on revised terms should commence immediately.

Pakistan cannot leverage trade to punish the TTP. It must engage directly with Kabul, but with more realistic expectations. Kabul will not publicly turn on former allies who once fought alongside it against the U.S.

However, patience must not be infinite. Pressure should be paired with a clear deadline and an explicit cost.

Three steps could separate the TTP issue from trade concerns.

First, a quiet path: intelligence operations conducted with Kabul’s implicit consent, during which Kabul looks the other way instead of being forced to defend its old allies publicly.

Second, a joint intelligence cell mediated by a neutral party such as Qatar to verify actions, so neither side can deny involvement.

Third, a 90-day benchmark. If TTP camps are not dismantled, Pakistan must transition from quiet cooperation to explicit diplomatic and economic pressure, while still avoiding the closure of trade.

Naila Mahsud is a Pakistani political and International relations researcher, with a focus on regional politics and security issues. X: @MahsudNaila

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