Red flags, a Shiite symbol of vengeance, were prominently displayed among the mourners at the weeklong funeral for Iran’s former supreme leader, signaling a clear message that Tehran should persist in its conflict with the United States.
Ultra‑hardliners in the Islamic Republic are demanding that Iran keep up its four‑decade‑long confrontation with Washington. Analysts interpret the display of flags as a sign of power‑brokering in Iran’s volatile post‑February political landscape, which became unstable after the United States and Israel launched a war that removed Iran’s top leadership.
Hard‑liners are exploiting the climate of mourning and national insecurity to limit the scope of acceptable political debate, portraying compromise as both strategically dangerous and morally illegitimate, said Saeid Golkar, a professor at the University of Tennessee who studies Iran’s security forces.
Hopes for a diplomatic compromise were dealt a setback last week when both the United States and Iran resumed military strikes. The renewed fighting stems from ongoing disputes over Iran’s control of vital shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz.
The breakdown of the cease‑fire imperiled a June 17 memorandum of understanding between the two sides that was meant to serve as a roadmap for future peace talks, including the fate of Iran’s nuclear program.
Hostilities resumed Saturday evening and continued into Sunday, with both Iran and the United States conducting strikes. Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz would be fully closed indefinitely after its navy fired warning shots at an unlicensed merchant vessel, according to state broadcaster IRIB. U.S. Central Command confirmed it was carrying out retaliatory strikes within Iranian territory.
The fresh fighting has sharpened the divide between those who prioritize continued military pressure and those who favor diplomatic engagement. “There is tension between those who favor the primacy of the ‘battlefield’ and those of the ‘diplomacy,’” said Ali Fathollah‑Nejad, director of the Berlin‑based Center for Middle East and Global Order. Hard‑line skeptics view Iran’s nuclear capabilities, ballistic missiles, and proxy networks as essential for regime survival and thus non‑negotiable.
The death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the war’s outset is widely seen as having bolstered the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ role in governing the country. Uncertainty has grown because his son and designated successor has not appeared publicly, fueling speculation about who is effectively in charge. “The political atmosphere is very fluid, we don’t really know who is running the regime,” said Golkar. “The system is changing; they need time to consolidate power.”
Hard‑liners are generally regarded as more vocal than influential, yet a sizable faction still favors negotiations, partly to revive Iran’s crippled economy.
Iran has experienced similar tensions in the past, notably during the Obama era when world powers negotiated the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. At that time, reformists pushed for internal reforms and pragmatic diplomacy, while conservatives sought to expel the United States from the region. The 2018 U.S. withdrawal under President Trump discredited the reformists, who were accused of caving to Washington, and allowed conservatives to tighten their grip on the government.
The ruling elite remains dominated by various hard‑line factions, noted Fathollah‑Nejad. While none tolerate internal dissent, a pragmatic segment argues that ending hostilities with the United States and reopening the economy is essential for the regime’s survival. A smaller, more radical group rejects any concessions—including on the nuclear program—and believes Iran can win by continuing the war.
Military dominance has curtailed the influence of political factions, giving security establishment priorities a higher shelf. Nonetheless, the current leadership has leaned toward negotiation. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Parliament speaker and chief negotiator, a former Revolutionary Guard commander, was a vocal critic of the 2015 nuclear talks. Even with the military’s tight grip, policymakers must still gauge the sentiment of hard‑line supporters, estimated at up to 20 % of Iran’s 93 million people, who formed the backbone of the week‑long funeral crowds. Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, who assumed the supreme leadership after his father’s death, echoed the call for revenge in a rare statement, pledging to avenge the blood of the slain. He did not attend his father’s funeral and has not been seen publicly since reportedly being gravely wounded in the initial February attacks. Khamenei earlier released an ambiguous statement accepting the spirit of the June 17 memorandum while opposing its formal signing “as a matter of principle.”
The equivocal stance opened a loophole for extremists to press their agenda, culminating in the prominent display of red flags at the funeral, many bearing the Arabic phrase “O Vengeance for Hussein.” As Mohammad Tabaar, a Texas A&M professor of Iranian politics, explained, hard‑liners argue that the Islamic Republic should explicitly threaten personal revenge for the deaths of its leaders and senior officials—not merely as a bargaining chip but as a deterrent to future strikes. He noted that this approach is increasingly reflected in the leadership’s use of red symbolism during Khamenei’s funeral.
Hossein Shariatmadari, the influential editor of Kayhan, whose columns often echo hard‑line views, challenged the negotiators’ decision to permit any traffic through the strait, writing a front‑page editorial headlined “We Want Trump’s Head.” The piece called on the government to brand the U.S. president a legitimate target and to announce a bounty for his assassination. Other conservative and extremist newspapers ran similarly aggressive front‑page threats against Trump. Beyond the supreme leader’s killing, hard‑liners hold Trump responsible for authorizing the 2020 assassination of Qassim Suleimani, a senior IRGC commander, in Baghdad.
The Iranian regime has long relied on crowd size as a symbol of legitimacy, pointing to the millions of mourners in both Iran and Iraq as proof of Tehran’s domestic and regional backing. Nonetheless, earlier this year economic hardships triggered large‑scale protests that were met with severe force, leaving many critics disillusioned that the conflict has not spurred regime change. Consequently, the government remains cautious about how its negotiation efforts are perceived by the public.
Policymakers are mindful of the regime’s core support base, which has sustained the government for four decades and rallies in times of crisis. “They cannot throw them under the bus,” noted Golkar. The leadership may be prepared to set aside its anti‑American rhetoric if a deal offers clear advantages. “If they see a mutually beneficial agreement and credible U.S. commitment, they would welcome it because it could broaden their base and appeal to Iranians seeking improved relations with America,” said Tabaar.
Current skepticism about U.S. reliability runs deep, with many Iranians fearing that President Trump, despite wanting a deal to curb oil prices, will ultimately abandon any agreement. Negotiators thus maintain a cautious distance to avoid appearing naive should Washington repudiates another pact. Trump was swift to declare the June 17 memorandum “over” during recent escalations. When asked why the Iranian delegation refused a public handshake with U.S. officials, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei cited Rumi: “Since there are many devils with human faces, one should not give one’s hand to every hand.”
Shirin Hakim and Rozhin Rajavi contributed reporting.
