Kyiv’s Drone Campaign Against Russian Energy Infrastructure Strains Ties with Washington

MOSCOW, RUSSIA – JUNE 18: Black smoke billows from the area of Gazprom Neftâs Moscow oil refinery, located on the southeastern outskirts of Moscow, on June 18, 2026, following what the Russian capitalâs mayor described as a âlarge-scale❠drone attack by Ukraine. Moscow came under one of the largest Ukrainian drone attacks since the start of the war, with an oil refinery struck and around 200 drones intercepted on their approach to the Russian capital, Mayor Sergey Sobyanin said Thursday. (Photo by Sefa Karacan/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Anadolu via Getty Images

Russia is facing an acute energy and fuel crisis as months of Ukrainian strikes on its refineries and other critical energy infrastructure take a heavy toll. The resulting fuel shortages have led to long lines at gas stations, economic slowdowns, and localized rationing across various Russian regions. This crisis has spilled beyond Russia’s borders, contributing to a surge in global diesel prices that pushed U.S. costs to over $6.00 a gallon. This economic pressure prompted President Donald Trump to publicly call on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Kyiv to halt attacks on Russian refineries, marking a significant flashpoint in the increasingly strained U.S.-Ukraine relationship. Trump simultaneously called on Russia to cease its targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On September 14, Trump claimed on social media that Kyiv and Moscow had agreed to a mutual halt on energy strikes; however, Ukrainian officials stated they were unaware of any such deal, and Zelenskyy expressed skepticism about whether Russia would honor such an agreement.

In many ways, this is not a new development. The energy front has long been central to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has systematically attempted to destroy Ukraine’s capacity to generate electricity while simultaneously leveraging its energy dominance to exert pressure on Europe.

Strategically, Russia remains committed to crippling Ukraine’s industrial and agricultural production and breaking the resolve of its population.

During the previous winter, Russia repeatedly targeted key energy facilities, including power generation, transmission, and distribution systems. More recently, Russian drones have shifted focus to smaller, more vulnerable Ukrainian power substations, aiming to damage the distribution network even when major generating facilities remain operational. By targeting transmission and distribution infrastructure, Russia seeks to limit the delivery of electricity from functional power plants to consumers and disrupt the transmission of power from Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. This systematic degradation of Ukraine’s energy system increases the economic costs of maintaining the country’s energy resilience and sustaining the war effort.

On the other hand, Ukraine’s strategy and the resulting impact are novel. Kyiv has shifted from early tactical strikes against key Russian energy arteries to a long-term, grinding, attritional strategy designed to wear down Russia’s refining capacity and deny the Kremlin a vital source of war revenue. This campaign disrupts the logistics of the Russian war machine while simultaneously making life difficult for ordinary Russians. As Ukraine’s strategy continues to evolve, the pressure on global fuel markets intensifies.

How is Ukraine Evolving Its Strategy Against Russian Energy Infrastructure?

Earlier this year, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense announced that its primary objective was to deprive Russia of the economic resources necessary to wage war, including targeting its shadow fleet and oil-and-gas revenues by striking refineries and petroleum storage facilities. This strategy had long been viewed with apprehension in both Washington and Brussels due to fears of rising fuel prices and heightened inflation. However, embracing this approach is highly rational given Ukraine’s personnel shortages, insufficient anti-missile defenses, and the difficulties associated with conducting conventional offensives, alongside the current state of the Russian economy.

Russia has repeatedly faltered to the advantage of its adversaries following military humiliations in wars widely viewed at home as avoidable and unpopular. In 1905, the humiliation against Japan triggered a barely suppressed revolution, while most infamously, in 1917, Russian incompetence facilitated the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power, leading to repeated famines, internal repression, and the execution or imprisonment of millions in GULAG labor camps. More recently, the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the humiliating cease-fire at the end of the First Chechen War in the 1990s demonstrated how military failure can destabilize the regime.

Russia’s already fragile economy, coupled with President Vladimir Putin’s disproportionate reliance on particular ethnic minority and remote regions for military manpower, and the Kremlin’s unwillingness to fully mobilize the populations of Moscow or St. Petersburg, suggests a deep-seated fear of domestic instability. Putin is clearly avoiding antagonizing Russia’s major urban centers, which remain the primary hubs of potential dissent.

Ukraine is hoping to capitalize on these vulnerabilities. Kyiv initially prioritized attacks on energy export infrastructure, including oil and refined product ports and terminals such as Ust-Luga, but has since shifted toward refineries, where physical damage can produce longer-lasting and more economically painful effects.

Attacks in June on refineries in Kapotnya, near Moscow, and in Tatarstan reduced their combined processing capacity by about 600,000 barrels per day (bpd). Since then, Ukraine’s strategy has shifted to targeting critical components such as pipelines and connections that keep plants offline longer, thereby creating a greater financial burden. The September attack on the Ryazan oil refinery exemplifies this approach, as sources reported that its CDU-6 unit, which processes approximately 8 million metric tons of crude annually, and its CDU-4 unit, which processes approximately 4 million tons annually, were shut down, at least temporarily.

The ultimate effectiveness of these attacks depends on whether Ukraine can continue causing damage faster than Russia can repair it. In August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the country would continue its deep strikes into Russian territory, following its high-profile attacks on Tobolsk in Siberia. Kyiv has also implemented its long-range sanctions plan, targeting Russian energy infrastructure, including key oil facilities.

How Global Market Shortages Are Aiding Russia

Despite Russia’s precipitous decline in fuel production by volume, the broader global energy market—suffering from severe shortages due to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East—has provided Russia with a financial windfall. The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects global oil supply to fall by 5.7 million bpd, or approximately 6%, due to continued disruptions in the Middle East, while global demand is projected to increase by 2.6 million bpd in 2027.

According to Reuters, Russian oil and gas revenue was projected to rise by 60% in July year-on-year, driven by higher global oil prices. Russia’s 2026 budget forecasts oil and gas revenue at 8.92 trillion rubles, slightly higher than the 8.48 trillion rubles collected in 2025. However, while prices have risen, they have not yet fully reversed the overall decline in Russia’s energy revenues.

Russian oil and gas revenue for January through July totaled 4.595 trillion rubles, representing a 16.8% year-on-year decline, though modestly above the government’s baseline projection of 4.467 trillion rubles. This relief was short-lived: according to Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, citing Russian Finance Ministry data, oil and gas revenue fell 16% year-on-year in August and was 55% lower than in July.

Russia’s Countermeasures and Internal Struggles

Many of these developments are beyond the direct control of both Moscow and Kyiv. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and the capture of Yemen’s West Coast by Iranian-backed Houthis have inadvertently rescued the Russian economy. While the Kremlin did not engineer these geopolitical developments, it can and will most likely prolong and exacerbate them to its strategic advantage.

In a testament to how international developments are obscuring the severity of Russia’s internal crisis, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced in July that Russia would begin importing oil products to stabilize the domestic market. This admission is hardly reassuring for a nation that once styled itself as an energy superpower. To maintain its domestic fuel market, Russia has since restricted fuel exports and arranged imports from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and India.

On August 24th, Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized the state to temporarily take control of critical infrastructure deemed inadequately protected against Ukrainian drone attacks. The decree covered fuel, energy, industry, communications, transport, and logistics facilities. This move represents another step toward a Soviet-style state monopoly that Putin and his inner circle nostalgically cherish.

As winter looms, the energy war is likely to devolve into a race over which side can better maintain its energy resilience. For Ukraine, this means protecting and repairing critical infrastructure under continued Russian attacks, which requires more anti-missile and anti-drone systems, both produced domestically and sourced from the West. For Russia, it means maintaining fuel supplies and repairing refineries while Ukrainian strikes continue to disrupt its energy system. The critical question remains whether rising global energy constraints and higher oil prices will allow Russia to offset some of these losses—and whether the West will permit the Kremlin to get away with it.

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