Latin American governments are deepening security cooperation with the United States on counter‑drone technology as criminal groups across the region rapidly adapt inexpensive commercial UAVs into sophisticated tools for surveillance, territorial control, and violence.
Drones now feature prominently in Colombia’s armed conflict, Brazil’s urban gang wars, and Mexico’s fragmented criminal landscape. Government responses are struggling to keep pace with the swift modifications that criminal organizations are making to cheap, commercially available drone technology.
More than simply acquiring drones, illicit groups have mastered the ability to retrofit consumer quadcopters and first‑person‑view (FPV) units with hand grenades, explosives, or advanced surveillance cameras. In Colombia and Mexico, these platforms can be purchased for as little as US $600–1,200, dramatically lowering the barrier to entry for violent drone operations.
The rapid diffusion of technical knowledge inside and between criminal networks means drone capabilities are evolving faster than authorities can contain them.
Colombia’s Anti‑Drone Squad
Colombia’s drone problem has escalated sharply. According to ACLED, the number of municipalities affected by drone attacks rose from 12 to 41 between 2024 and 2025, while illegal drone incidents jumped from 38 to 149 in the same period. In response, the government unveiled a projected $1.68 billion “Escudo Nacional Antidrones” shield program. The multi‑phase initiative focuses on detection, interception, security‑personnel training, and the creation of a specialized military unit.
Announced on January 16, 2026, the plan is now in its initial implementation phase, with early successes reported in drone seizures and targeted operations against “explosivistas especializados en drones” recruited by criminal groups for their expertise in weaponizing commercial UAVs.
Supply‑chain disruption is another pillar of Colombia’s strategy. Legislation now restricts drone imports at key chokepoints such as the Cartagena Regional Customs Directorate and Bogotá’s El Dorado International Airport, and tightens controls on postal‑service and express‑delivery shipments. Nevertheless, regulatory gaps remain.
In the Catatumbo region, Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerrillas have equipped drones with thermal‑imaging sensors for round‑the‑clock surveillance. Coordinated “swarm attacks” and persistent loiterers over communities serve as psychological weapons to dominate territory and erode public confidence in state security forces.
The Colombian government, led by President Aberlardo de la Espriella, now views criminal drone capabilities as a permanent feature of the nation’s security landscape. In response, criminal groups are developing fiber‑optic drone technologies to bypass existing electronic‑jamming defenses.
Drones as Intelligence Tools in Brazil’s Favelas
Brazilian authorities are countering drone use in contested urban zones—most notably São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro—through localized, intelligence‑driven measures.
Rio’s Civil Police established the Coordenadoria de Operações com Aeronaves Não Tripuladas (COANT), integrating drones into police operations for mapping and real‑time monitoring. São Paulo’s police have prioritized intelligence‑led surveillance and have even experimented with drone‑gun systems to neutralize illicit UAVs.
These efforts are designed to blunt the operational advantage enjoyed by powerful gangs such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV). Both groups reportedly employ drones to monitor favela environments, track law‑enforcement movements, identify rival positions, and coordinate attacks while minimizing the risk to their operatives.
Earlier this year, the CV and the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) used modified drones to launch grenades and explosives at each other in Rio’s favelas. In July, a CV drone detonated a bomb in the Curicica neighborhood as the faction sought to expand its territorial control, according to federal prosecutors.
Brazil’s strategy aims to reverse the intelligence edge that drones have given criminal organizations. Yet intelligence‑focused actions such as strikes and equipment seizures cannot fully eliminate drone operations. The low cost of commercial hardware allows syndicates to rapidly replace lost assets, sustaining their territorial dominance.
Mexico Targets Drone Experts
Both federal and state authorities in Mexico are imposing harsher penalties on specialist drone operators, manufacturers, technical facilitators, and suppliers. Federal legislation strengthened in 2024 establishes prison terms of 10–20 years for drone‑delivered attacks involving explosives or weapons, and 5–10 years for manufacturing, acquiring, or adapting drones to transport prohibited materials. Combined sentences can reach 40 years.
In the State of Mexico, lawmakers are considering a proposal that would impose up to 18 years in prison for using drones to conduct surveillance or gather intelligence to facilitate crimes such as robbery, livestock theft, and dispossession.
These measures specifically target “droneros”—experienced operators who are prized by Mexican criminal groups for their technical proficiency in sophisticated weaponry. The penal code also aims at engineers and bomb‑makers capable of rebuilding lost drone capabilities using readily available components.
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) has repeatedly demonstrated advanced drone tactics in Michoacán and Jalisco, launching improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against rival groups, security forces, and civilians to secure trafficking routes. CJNG’s expertise has reportedly spread to allied groups such as Familia Michoacana, while smaller coalitions like Carteles Unidos have also adopted similar tactics after acquiring skilled operators, illustrating the broad diffusion of drone know‑how.
The success of Mexico’s approach will hinge on building robust intelligence, forensic, and prosecutorial capacities to identify and dismantle the specialized operator networks that sustain these drone operations.