An Optimism governance proposal published on November 5 mandates a minimum 30-day public notice period before a chain transfers upgrade control from the shared Security Council, allowing users to evaluate potential changes to the network’s security model.
The proposed Standard Rollup Charter amendment applies to chains whose upgrade authority currently rests with the Council under the Charter. Under the amendment, a Chain Governor may request transfer of control to a address of its choosing, enabling self-governance or third-party management of upgrades.
Upon completion of a transfer, the chain would rely on the security model of the new upgrade key holder. Consequently, Optimism Governance and the Security Council would lose their practical ability to enforce the Charter’s policies on that chain through upgrade authority.
The accompanying GitHub amendment PR 74 remained open as of November 5 and is scheduled to merge only upon governance approval of the proposal.
A governor would initially submit a transfer request to the Optimism Foundation, which would validate the request against the governor’s commitments and subsequently publish notice on the Governance Forum.
The notice must identify the chain, its Chain ID, and relevant layer-1 contract addresses, and must warn that proceeding with the transfer would result in the chain losing its Standard Rollup status.
The Security Council would be required to wait at least 30 days following notice publication before executing the transfer. The proposed policy mandates that the Council verify the Foundation published the notice, that the minimum waiting period has elapsed, and that the recipient address matches the one supplied by the Foundation on the governor’s behalf.
A transfer satisfying the approved policy’s conditions would not require additional Optimism Governance approval, thereby eliminating the need for a separate vote for each handover.
PROPOSED PROCESSGovernorrequests transferFoundationconfirms + posts notice30days minimumfrom public noticeCouncilexecutes transferSpacing is schematic.Chain commitments still apply.
Who would control upgrades?
Who would control upgrades?Before transferAfter execution
Before transfer, the Council would retain upgrade authority under the Charter. A qualifying transfer would need no further governance vote.
Security CouncilShared upgrade authorityUPGRADE CONTROLThe same chainStandard Rollup retainedSecurity CouncilShared upgrade authorityUPGRADE CONTROLThe same chainStandard Rollup status retained
Under the proposed route, users would rely on the chosen key holder. A qualifying transfer would need no further governance vote.
Governor’s chosen addressNew upgrade key holderUPGRADE CONTROLThe same chainStandard Rollup status endsGovernor’s chosen addressNew upgrade key holdercontrolsThe same chainStandard Rollup status ends
A completed transfer would change upgrade control and end Standard Rollup status.
Proposed policy as of November 5, 2026. Chain agreements remain; no executed transfer or universal user exit guarantee is established.
The proposal maintains existing agreements with the Foundation, including legal commitments and restrictions governing when a governor may request a transfer.
Executing a transfer would cause the chain to lose Standard Rollup status, with the Foundation updating its classification in the Superchain Registry; external assessments of the chain’s decentralization stage may also shift.
The notice window provides users with time to evaluate who will control future upgrades and determine whether to continue using the chain under the new arrangement.
The next milestone involves governance acceptance and subsequent merger of the Charter amendment. Adoption of the policy would require no smart contract or node software changes, and any future handover would initiate with a separate request and public notice.
