For a decade, Yemen’s civil war was framed as a regional conflict, contained within the southern Arabian Peninsula. The escalation of 2024-2025, and the violence of this year, have exposed that assumption as a costly miscalculation. The war now reaches into every corner of the globe, choking international trade, threatening maritime navigation and testing the strategic interests of all major powers.

The Houthis’ capacity—enabled by Iranian backing—to threaten shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, one of the planet’s most vital maritime chokepoints, is not an isolated military achievement. It is the direct consequence of the collapse of Yemeni state institutions, the steady erosion of international support for the legitimate government, the multiplication of armed factions and the collision of competing regional agendas.

Recent months have shown that freedom of navigation cannot be restored by aircraft carriers and naval task forces alone. Lasting security demands confronting the underlying drivers of the crisis—not merely its symptoms.

Now grappling with the fallout of Houthi strikes on commercial shipping, the international community did remarkably little to halt Yemen’s slide into disintegration. Worse, certain decisions helped enable the Houthis’ capture of Sanaa in September 2014.

That coup was a decisive rupture. It ended the post-2011 political transition and paved the way for a parallel armed authority with its own political agenda—one that today controls strategic territory, including the approaches to Bab al-Mandeb and the highlands that command the Red Sea.

Most alarming, the Houthis inherited the residual strength of a state whose military once ranked among the most heavily armed in the Arab world. This fusion of territorial control, inherited state and military capability and external sponsorship has made the Houthi threat more severe and more enduring than anything previously posed by ISIS or al-Qaeda.

Yet the international response has failed to match that reality. The Houthis have not been treated with the seriousness accorded to ISIS and al-Qaeda, nor has the restoration of Yemeni national institutions been made a genuine priority. Instead, they have been approached as a force to be contained, negotiated with or instrumentalised.

Rather than defending the Yemeni state, the international community settled for temporary arrangements and diplomatic pressure. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement on the strategic port city of Hodeidah illustrates the pattern. It delivered a ceasefire, a mutual redeployment and UN-supervised security and financial mechanisms intended to channel port revenues to the Central Bank rather than to the Houthis. In practice, however, the deal cemented Houthi control over the port and the wider city, tilting the balance of power decisively in their favour—an outcome widely resented across anti-Houthi ranks.

In 2021, the Houthis tightened that grip after the baffling withdrawal of the Joint Forces on the Western Coast, a coalition then fighting alongside the internationally recognised government.

Neither the Joint Forces nor their regional backers had alerted the Yemeni government or the United Nations to the movement. Residents of the affected areas were given just 24 hours’ notice—far too little time to evacuate safely.

The episode laid bare more than the failure of the Stockholm Agreement, a breakdown acknowledged by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen. It also exposed the disarray of the broader anti-Houthi front, undermined by competing centres of military decision-making, weak coordination with the government and mounting fractures within the regional coalition.

Instead of consolidating a national army under the legitimate government and its defence ministry, the coalition tolerated the rise of numerous local formations operating beyond the state’s chain of command. This fragmentation was evident in Emirati support for the separatist Southern Transitional Council and in Saudi Arabia’s diverging priorities.

By empowering armed groups that reject the authority of the very state they claim to defend, Yemen’s international backers left the anti-Houthi camp splintered. The Houthis, in turn, consolidated their gains and sidestepped a decisive confrontation with a unified Yemeni army.

The consequence is stark. Today, the region and the world confront a militia that has seized control of a state and now fields drones, ballistic missiles and, potentially, hypersonic weapons. It commands a coastline along a major waterway and wields geography itself as a tool of coercion and blackmail.

The international answer has been a naval deployment. Yet however advanced, maritime operations may succeed in intercepting missiles; they cannot produce a durable solution while the conditions that let an armed group launch attacks from Yemeni territory remain intact.

Framing the Houthi threat as a discrete maritime problem treats only its symptoms and leaves its causes untouched. The security of the Red Sea cannot be separated from the security of the states that border it.

Yemen commands nearly 2,500 kilometres of coastline along the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and overlooks Bab al-Mandeb. Any credible strategy must therefore treat the crisis as a matter of state, sovereignty and institutions—not as a contest between rival factions.

That means restoring the primacy of the national-state project, strengthening legitimate institutions, unifying military and security forces under a single command, dismantling the multiplicity of power centres and pursuing a political settlement—one reached only after the armed groups, the Houthis foremost among them, have been defeated, so that a stable state can finally take root.

Every Gulf state, the UAE included, must recognise that its own security and stability hinge on reviving the Yemeni state and reinforcing its military and security institutions. Accommodating or empowering armed groups—the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council alike—can only deepen instability.

The wider international community must likewise grasp that rebuilding the Yemeni state is not a purely Yemeni concern. It is a strategic imperative for the entire world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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