Russian Migration to EU Surges as War in Ukraine Enters Fourth Year

The number of Russian citizens legally residing in the EU has grown by 105,000 since Russia launched its full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, reaching 876,600 by the end of 2025, an analysis of Eurostat data shows.

The figure represents a 13.6% rise from the 771,800 Russians holding valid temporary or permanent residence permits across EU member states in 2021. Germany hosts the largest community, with 218,000 residents, followed by Spain (116,800) and Estonia (78,400).

Southern Europe has seen the sharpest growth: Spain issued residence permits to 44,400 Russian nationals over the period, France 13,700, while Cyprus and Portugal saw their Russian‑born populations increase 2.5 and 3.5 times, respectively.

Several EU states have moved in the opposite direction. Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic have recorded the largest drops in Russian residents, driven by tough migration policies and, in the Baltic states, security concerns over large Russian‑speaking communities.

Significant communities have also formed outside the EU. In Serbia the Russian population rose from roughly 5,000 before the invasion to 61,900 by the end of 2025. By spring of this year, Kazakhstan had absorbed more than 107,000 Russian migrants, while Armenia and Georgia hosted 43,500 and 70,000, respectively.

Turkey drew large numbers in the immediate post‑invasion period but later tightened residency rules. By June, valid Russian permits there had fallen to 75,900, half the 2023 peak.

Researchers tracking emigration patterns have identified at least four distinct waves since February 2022. The most recent, running from this spring, has been sparked by renewed claims of impending mobilisation for Moscow’s all‑out war in Ukraine.

“Everyone now understands that they have no future in Russia. There is no image of the future, no understanding of what will happen in six months or a year,” said Anastasia Burakova, a lawyer and founder of Kovcheg, a legal assistance project for Russians abroad. “What is more, there are risks linked to mobilisation and conscription, which people feel very personally.”

‘Now I have nothing and I feel free’

Ivan, 19, left Russia this spring to avoid conscription and now works in construction in Yerevan, posting videos on YouTube. A year earlier he had been a mobile phone store manager.

“I thought: this is it, this is life, everything is going the way it should,” he said in a YouTube video. “Now I’m sitting on a bench in Yerevan, with no title and no steady job. My wife is next to me. Back then I was a manager and felt trapped. Now I have nothing, and I feel free.”

Surveys by independent researchers show the Russian emigrees include predominantly young couples, often without children, with both partners under 36.

They tend to have high levels of education and are concentrated in professions either vulnerable to political repression — journalists, human rights workers, political analysts — or in high international demand, particularly IT, engineering and academia. Around 20% of those who left do not hold university degrees. Some 18% are studying or plan to study abroad.

They fall into three broad groups: those who have settled and expect to remain abroad long‑term, those who have already moved once and are preparing to relocate again, and those still in Russia who intend to leave within six months.

The economic impact on host countries has been visible yet uneven. In Armenia and Georgia, the sudden influx of people and capital contributed to GDP growth of between 9% and 9.4% at its peak between 2022 and 2024, according to analysis published by the CASE Center research institute.

Average Russian household incomes in Serbia ran to around €3,500 per month against a local average of €900. In Georgia the figures were €3,300 against €650. The effect has since moderated as host economies adapted, with growth settling back to 5–7% annually.

Rather than competing for local jobs, most Russian migrants have worked remotely or set up their own businesses.

In IT, up to 41% have maintained income from foreign clients, while in the media sector around 21% have done so, channelling money into host economies through taxes and everyday spending.

Meanwhile, Russian authorities and independent researchers have documented some returns, but the scale remains disputed.

The independent OutRush sociological project estimated that no more than 8% of emigrants had returned to Russia by summer 2024, with around 5% more intending to do so.

The Institute of Applied Economic Research at RANEPA, a state‑linked academic institution, put the overall return rate from the 2022–2023 wave at roughly 10%.

Estimates from consulting firms and recruitment agencies are considerably higher, ranging from 16% among IT workers to 40–45% of those who left at the peak.

Commonly cited reasons for returning include difficulty finding work, legal status problems and the closure of relocated Russian businesses.

Russia’s own official resettlement programme recorded a historic low in 2025, drawing only 26,700 people into the country.

Euronews could not independently verify Russian government data.

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