For the first twenty years of my service as a special operations helicopter pilot, I conducted missions at low altitudes, vigilantly monitoring both enemy forces and our own units below.
Space has become the definitive high ground in modern warfare. Control of orbital assets provides an unequivocal edge over adversaries. Recent combat operations in Iran, Ukraine, and Venezuela—where space capabilities underpinned every phase of military activity—underscored that space is no longer a secondary player.
Our continued superiority in space, coupled with denial of access to advanced adversaries, is essential across maritime, air, ground, and cyber domains. Yet bureaucratic complacency threatens that edge, even as America’s space capabilities remain pivotal.
In my capacity as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, I realized that the mission of each service is not simply to build the finest individual branch, but to forge the world’s most effective joint force. Central to that endeavor is securing uncontested space dominance. To outpace potential rivals, the Department of Defense must hasten its adoption of agile, commercially engineered space systems purpose‑built for speed, resilience, and active orbital operations.
For decades, national‑security agencies have relied on “exquisite” space platforms: large, multi‑billion‑dollar satellites that can take years to develop but are presumed to operate passively in orbit for a decade or more. In today’s environment, such platforms are vulnerable soft targets. If an adversary jams a legacy communications node or destroys a critical observation asset, replenishment can take years—a systemic vulnerability we cannot tolerate.
China has recognized this weakness and is aggressively deploying commercial‑derived technologies that circumvent traditional advantages. In 2024, the Space Force publicly confirmed five Chinese satellites executing coordinated proximity maneuvers in low‑Earth orbit—deemed by Gen. Mike Guetlein as satellite “dogfighting.” Beijing has further demonstrated on‑orbit refueling in geostationary orbit, extending the endurance of assets that the U.S. cannot yet match.
To counter these threats, Defense must urgently pivot. We must institutionalize a new class of space capabilities built upon highly resilient, rapid, and mass‑proliferated orbital architectures.
True space superiority demands systems capable of active orbital mobility—able to maneuver on demand, conduct real‑time anomaly inspections, and actively protect critical assets by engaging threats. If an adversary disrupts an asset, the system should instantaneously deploy additional units. If a satellite loses maneuvering capability or requires an adjustment, a responsive orbital vehicle must rendezvous to sustain the mission.
Achieving this resilience requires moving beyond the traditional defense industrial base. Legacy prime contractors excel at exquisite platforms, but their business models are ill‑suited for the rapid, iterative hardware production and software‑driven agility essential to modern space warfare. The true engine of America’s space advantage lies in the emergent, non‑traditional sector.
A new cohort of firms—primarily venture‑backed tech startups staffed by top engineering talent—approach space as a dynamic canvas for innovation rather than a static laboratory. Since leaving the Pentagon, I have worked with entities such as Turion Space and Eutelsat Network Solutions, but many others invest in the infrastructure of situational awareness, rapid response, and orbital mobility that we urgently need.
These companies operate on commercial timelines, responding to broad operational needs rather than detailed specifications. They are willing to assume technical risks that conventional contractors avoid, often pursuing commercial advantage alongside national‑security imperatives. Crucially, they leverage America’s dual strengths: deep capital markets and a vibrant innovation culture.
From my perspective at the Pentagon, I observed a persistent pull toward familiar prime contractors, stubborn despite lessons from the past decade.
The Space‑Based Infrared System, intended to detect and warn of missile launches worldwide, launched nearly a decade late and cost‑overran fivefold. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency constellation suffered delayed delivery and multiple Nunn‑McCurdy breaches. The GPS ground‑control system program, OCX, was cancelled after $6.3 billion were expended with no core capabilities delivered. GPS modernization efforts likewise stuttered due to misaligned field‑deployment timelines between satellites and user terminals.
Congress has granted acquisition leaders the legislative flexibility necessary to move swiftly and adopt non‑traditional contracting paths. The Department of Defense’s senior leaders have also signaled that business‑as‑usual is unacceptable and that a commercial‑first approach—with its accompanying risks—is required. Yet it demands courage for an acquisition leader to expose a program’s cost, schedule, and performance to an alternative supplier lacking decades of experience yet offering potential for accelerated delivery.
The current administration deserves commendation for presenting a budget that represents the most substantial increase in space capabilities since the Space Force’s inception. However, if program managers and portfolio acquisition executives do not seize the opportunity to invest in the emerging space industrial base, private capital will divert elsewhere, engineering talent will disperse, and we risk forfeiting a generational window to cement joint‑force superiority.
A widely accepted management principle holds that outcomes reflect inspection rather than expectation. If program managers are expected to exploit commercially‑developed hardware and software through instruments such as Commercial Solutions Openings and Other Transaction Authorities, establishing policies that prioritize these tools may catalyze behavioral change. Rather than a one‑size‑fits‑all rule, Congress and the department could collaborate to institutionalize a legal expectation that newer, under‑used tools are the first choice.
While traditional defense contractors will remain necessary for certain expertise, access to that expertise must be transformed. They must operate at the same pace and incentive structures as the emerging defense‑technology sector. We cannot afford the status quo when space superiority hangs in the balance.
I remain convinced that building the world’s best joint force requires resilient fleets of agile, commercially‑developed space assets capable of generating active domain awareness and executing responsive operations. The technology exists today—ready in the hands of America’s most innovative companies—awaiting the Department of Defense to clear bureaucratic hurdles and issue the contracts. For the joint force’s future, it is time to remove bureaucratic barriers.
Gen. (Ret) Jim Slife was the 41st Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He is now an Operating Partner at both Scout Ventures and FTG & Co. Investment Bank, a Senior Principal at Pallas Advisors, and a board member and strategic advisor for a number of defense technology and aerospace firms.