Six months into the US‑Iran war: Gains, losses, and the ongoing stalemate

Six months have passed since February 28, when the United States and Israel launched a coordinated missile assault on Iran. The strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, several senior Iranian officials in Tehran, and reportedly many children in a school in Minab, in southern Iran.

U.S. President Donald Trump initially predicted the conflict would conclude within “four to five weeks.”

Since the initial blows, the fighting has expanded to multiple fronts, extending as far as the Caspian Sea. The war has spurred a global oil supply crunch as the United States and Iran contest control of the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint through which over one‑fifth of the world’s oil and natural‑gas cargo passes. The violence has also caused an estimated 8,000‑10,000 deaths and left tens of thousands injured.

Experts note the conflict is reshaping the international order, with new alliances forming and historic partnerships showing signs of fracture.

Has the United States achieved any of its war objectives?

Washington’s aims were never fully clarified; U.S. officials initially framed the strikes as preemptive self‑defence.

According to a series of sometimes contradictory statements by Trump and senior defence officials, the goals include the following.

Iran’s nuclear programme

Trump claimed the United States had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities when Israel’s 12‑day offensive on Iran ended in June 2025. Yet in February, both Washington and Jerusalem asserted that Tehran was only weeks away from developing a weapon.

Repeated assaults on Iranian nuclear sites have inflicted extensive damage, but Tehran is still believed to possess 440 kg of highly enriched uranium—enough for a bomb. The Trump administration demanded Iran hand over this stock to the United States and pledge to end uranium enrichment. Iran declined, though it indicated willingness at one point to transfer the material to a third country. Tehran also insisted on retaining the capacity for a civilian nuclear power programme, which requires lower‑level enrichment.

Later, Trump briefly suggested a U.S. military operation to seize the stockpile, a move that could provoke a major escalation.

The June 17 memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by both sides saw Iran agree not to pursue a nuclear weapon—a commitment it has long made. The agreement, however, unravelled because of vague wording that sparked disagreements over its actual obligations.

Clark Summers, a U.S. military veteran and professor at Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina, said the United States “can rightly assert that these ends have been achieved. Although for how long before Iran can rebuild is difficult to assess.”

Alam Saleh, an Iran expert at the Australian National University (ANU), countered that Iran’s nuclear power programme remains intact. “The U.S. lost even before the war,” he said, adding that this demonstrates Washington’s failure in last year’s 12‑day conflict.

Regime change in Iran

On the first day of the war—February 28—the United States killed Khamenei and several other senior leaders. Two days earlier, Trump had declared that regime change would be “the best thing that could happen.”

During the missile strikes, Trump urged “Iranian patriots who yearn for freedom to seize this moment to be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country.”

Iran’s political leadership, however, has largely persisted under the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei—the late ayatollah’s son.

Summers suggested the objective may have been improvised rather than carefully planned. “Killing leaders does not mean strategic achievements, even if it’s a tactical success,” Saleh observed.

Ending support for regional proxy groups

Iran’s “axis of resistance” encompasses a network of armed groups it funds, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and smaller factions in Iraq and Syria.

There is little evidence that Tehran’s backing of these groups has ceased, and this demand was omitted from the MoU signed with the United States.

Hezbollah entered the war with Israel in Iran’s defence, and Iran has refused to negotiate an end to hostilities unless the Lebanon front is included. Meanwhile, the Houthis have imposed a blockade on Saudi Arabia through the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, partially in support of Iran.

Iran’s ballistic‑missile programme

Washington promised to “raze” Iran’s missile facilities when hostilities began on February 28 and also vowed to destroy the Iranian navy.

Trump later claimed roughly 82 percent of Iran’s missiles had been eliminated and that the navy was degraded. In April, he said 158 Iranian naval vessels had been hit, while U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has reported dozens of strikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command centres.

Despite these strikes, Iran has continued to launch missiles, most recently firing a long‑range weapon in July that killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan.

Furthermore, the demand to end Iran’s ballistic‑missile programme was also absent from the July MoU.

Control of Iranian oil

In June, Trump announced the United States would seize and control Kharg Island, the hub of Iranian oil production.

To date, the United States does not hold any Iranian territory.

What have the United States and Iran gained and lost during the war?

Beyond the original U.S. demands, the conflict has generated additional pressure points.

Control of the Strait of Hormuz

Shortly after the war’s outbreak, Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, which runs through its and Oman’s territorial waters. Daily vessel traffic plummeted from over 100 ships to an average of about five.

To enforce this closure, Iran began targeting vessels in the strait—the only route to the open ocean for Gulf oil and gas producers that lack explicit Iranian permission.

The United States responded with a naval blockade of Iranian ports in and around the strait, a measure that continues.

Despite numerous expletive‑laden social‑media demands by Trump that Tehran reopen the waterway, Iran has not relented. It is currently negotiating with Oman regarding the future of this critical sea lane, which once carried more than one‑fifth of global oil and natural‑gas shipments.

During these talks, Iran announced this week that it has agreed to a shipping route that it will partially control in cooperation with Oman.

Trump recently declared that the United States now has “full control” of the strait and that it is open to all vessels, yet traffic remains at historic lows and Iran continues to fire on ships attempting to pass without its authorization.

For Iran, the strait represents its primary leverage in the conflict, which analysts say Tehran views as an “existential threat.”

Economic impact

• Iran: The war has devastated Iran’s economy. The rial has effectively collapsed, food prices have soared, and the U.S. blockade together with renewed sanctions have crippled Iranian oil exports, cutting revenue by at least $6 billion. Tehran’s economy has long suffered under U.S. sanctions, though a fragile ceasefire earlier provided temporary relief. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said last week that economic pressure is a “rerun we know by heart” and that his country knows how to survive it.
• United States: U.S. consumers have felt the strain at the pump, rendering the conflict highly unpopular. A July poll by The Associated Press showed two‑thirds of Americans oppose the war. While many may forget there is a war, Summers noted, they remember it acutely when gasoline prices rise. In states like California, gasoline prices doubled. This anger is likely to translate into a political backlash against Republicans in November’s midterm elections, experts say.

Relations with allies

• Iran: Iran’s targeting of U.S. military assets and of both military and civilian infrastructure in neighboring Gulf states and Jordan has not endeared it to regional partners, analysts observe. Iran has struck infrastructure in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. These states have denounced the attacks as violations of their sovereignty. However, Iran’s economic and political ties with China have endured, with Beijing carefully avoiding full entanglement while opposing sanctions on Tehran. Trade relations with Russia also remain strong.
• United States: The United States has encountered reluctance from its NATO allies, who have refused to join the war despite direct appeals from Trump. Spain and Italy have sharply criticised the conflict, as has Germany—Israel’s strongest European ally. France has declined to send warships to enforce the blockade. Gulf allies, Pakistan and Turkiye have similarly declined, while Japan, Australia and South Korea have also refrained from involvement. Gulf partners are likely weighing the fact that the U.S.’s war on Iran has made them targets.

Military capabilities

• Iran: U.S. analysts confirm Washington’s claims that Iran’s military capabilities have been degraded. Several bases have been hit, and Iran’s ballistic missile stocks are down by roughly 82 percent, according to Trump. Nonetheless, Iran continues to launch missiles and, while nuclear sites have been damaged, it retains its enriched‑uranium stockpile. Experts suggest Tehran’s appetite for a nuclear weapon may now be greater than before the war. The country also continues to produce and deploy its mass‑produced, low‑cost Shahed drones. An estimated 1,221 Iranian military personnel were killed by April, though the true toll is likely higher.
• United States: The United States has lost 18 service members and more than 750 have been wounded—a relatively low figure, according to Summers. However, U.S. media reports indicate the Pentagon has sharply depleted stocks of some of its most powerful and expensive weapons—particularly Patriot air‑defence missiles—though Washington denies this. Those missiles are produced in limited numbers annually and cost millions each. In August, the U.S. signed a $22.9 billion deal with Raytheon to increase Tomahawk cruise‑missile production from 60 to over 1,000 per year.

Is there an outright ‘victor’?

Observers agree there is none.

“Both sides have failed to achieve anything,” Saleh of ANU said, noting that the United States has not translated its military superiority into tangible gains despite being a “superpower” confronting a “middle power.”

China and Russia, he added, are likely reassessing Washington’s weaknesses and recalibrating their own military strategies in anticipation of a future conflict with the United States. This has ramifications for Taiwan, especially as the U.S. has now deployed its final aircraft carrier in the Pacific to the Middle East, leaving the Western Pacific without a carrier—a shift that departs from prior strategic emphasis.

“Iran’s survival also does not amount to a victory,” Saleh cautioned. “This may be a defeat for the United States, but it is not a triumph for Iran either.”

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