After more than three years of devastating conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan remains in urgent need of a comprehensive political settlement. The relentless violence has inflicted profound suffering upon the population, and a purely military resolution cannot rebuild the fractured state or reunite its deeply divided society. In this context, any initiative aimed at fostering internal Sudanese dialogue warrants serious consideration rather than immediate dismissal.
In August, a self-appointed committee of nineteen prominent Sudanese figures, led by Ahfad University President Qasim Badri, launched an initiative to lay the groundwork for national dialogue within Sudan. Prior to this, the committee met with Sudanese Armed Forces chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, calling for the removal of legal restrictions on opposition figures. In response, the authorities issued a decree dropping certain politically motivated charges against Sudanese citizens returning from abroad to participate in dialogue, while also granting temporary legal protections to participants. Though limited, these steps represent crucial confidence-building measures.
Despite its goals, the initiative has encountered strong opposition. The civilian coalition Sumoud, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, as well as Ta’sis—an alliance that includes the RSF—have rejected the proposed internal dialogue. They question the initiative’s independence, warning that holding discussions in army-controlled territories could legitimize General al-Burhan’s authority and deepen national divisions. These concerns are legitimate and merit serious attention. However, the committee maintains that it does not seek to negotiate Sudan’s future or dictate the agenda of a national dialogue. Instead, its mandate is to facilitate conditions that allow Sudanese political actors to engage directly with one another. The critical challenge remains whether the committee can fulfill this role without allowing one side of the conflict to dominate the process. Dismissing the initiative before it has had a chance to prove its utility would be premature.
Sudan’s political actors and civil society organizations remain deeply fragmented, and past mediation efforts have repeatedly faltered. The ongoing conflict continues to obstruct comprehensive political engagement. The committee’s initiative represents an attempt to break this deadlock. Preparations for political dialogue should not be postponed until the cessation of hostilities. While securing a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian access remain urgent priorities, the groundwork for political dialogue can proceed concurrently with these efforts.
The committee’s members were not elected and do not represent every political constituency. However, the legitimacy of the committee cannot be assessed solely based on its formation. It must also be measured by its ability to bring a broader spectrum of political actors into the national dialogue process.
Good intentions alone cannot address concerns regarding credibility. For political dialogue to succeed, participants must believe that the process is fair and independent. The legitimacy required to facilitate a political opening is not identical to that needed to negotiate a national settlement. Nevertheless, even a preparatory initiative must earn the trust of the political actors it seeks to unite.
The committee’s meeting with General al-Burhan was a practical necessity. As army chief and head of the Sovereignty Council, he was in a position to respond to the committee’s demands for legal protections. Engaging with al-Burhan does not inherently constitute an endorsement of his authority. However, if the initiative becomes too closely aligned with the military, other political actors may perceive it as an extension of al-Burhan’s political agenda rather than an independent facilitator. The committee must therefore demonstrate that its engagement extends beyond military authorities and that it is prepared to cooperate with political forces opposing them.
The initiative was launched in Khartoum, a city currently under army control. This raises legitimate concerns about whether a process initiated in territory controlled by one side of the conflict can gain the trust of political forces across the nation. A national dialogue cannot be restricted to a single geographical or political constituency. Different regions have experienced vastly different realities of war, governance, displacement, and insecurity. The committee must find ways to reach those living outside army-controlled areas, including Sudanese displaced by the fighting, and ensure they can participate freely and without intimidation.
The rejection of the initiative by Sumoud and Ta’sis does not automatically invalidate the process. Their concerns deserve careful consideration, but outright rejection at this early stage risks closing off a vital opportunity for political engagement. At the same time, their absence is highly significant. Sudan’s crisis is too deep and complex to be resolved by any single political faction. While the committee cannot expect immediate endorsement from all stakeholders, it must create conditions that persuade reluctant actors to participate. Failure to do so would render the initiative unsuccessful.
The African Union Commission and the Arab League have also welcomed the initiative, providing an important measure of regional support. Their endorsement strengthens the effort to revive Sudanese-led political dialogue, although external backing cannot replace the confidence of Sudan’s own political forces.
The committee’s initiative should therefore be assessed without excessive optimism or automatic suspicion. The legal measures announced following its engagement with al-Burhan are an encouraging first step, but the real test lies ahead. Can it help remove legal and political obstacles facing opposition actors in practice, rather than merely on paper? Can it win the confidence of those who have rejected it? Can it ensure that Sudanese across the nation’s political and geographical divides have an opportunity to participate freely?
What is clear, however, is that Sudan’s crisis will ultimately require Sudanese actors with profoundly different visions of the country’s future to sit together and engage in political dialogue. No committee can negotiate on their behalf, and no external actor can do it for them. At best, a preparatory initiative can help create the conditions under which such engagement becomes possible. The concerns raised by critics should not be dismissed, but neither should they serve as grounds for rejecting the initiative before it has had an opportunity to address them. Those who have rejected it should remain open to reconsidering their position if the committee demonstrates that it can build an independent and inclusive process. If it succeeds, it will have rendered an important national service.
