The 2026 midterm elections appear to have delivered the final blow to the Trump administration’s proposed $1.45 trillion Fiscal Year 2027 Department of Defense budget request. A path may still exist to preserve the $1.1 trillion base budget request, but a legislative route for the additional $350 billion reconciliation request now looks nearly impossible. The reconciliation proposal was always a heavy lift, given persistent divisions within the Congressional Republican caucus. Yet the scale of the midterm losses and the compressed legislative calendar have pushed its chances out of reach. Senate Majority Leader John Thune and Speaker of the House Mike Johnson would face a daunting challenge holding their respective caucuses together through the lame-duck session to pass it. Johnson has announced he is stepping down, further weakening his ability to whip votes. Even the Pentagon has begun to accept the likely outcome, with planning already under way to protect its highest priorities.
Once that reality is acknowledged, considerable uncertainty remains about what comes next. Four questions now dominate the debate over the defense budget and defense spending: whether Congress can agree on FY2027 appropriations; what spending can be shifted from the reconciliation request into the base budget, and what would be cut to make room for it; whether supplemental funding will materialize, either as a standalone bill or within a broader funding agreement, to replenish accounts drained by operations in Iran; and whether yet another continuing resolution will be passed to defer funding decisions until the 120th Congress is seated.
This backlog will slow the Pentagon’s ability to advance its stated priorities as quickly as it would like, and it will reassert Congress’s ultimate authority over the budgeting process.
Why a Lame-Duck Congress Won’t Take Up the Mantle
Defense spending has grown rapidly in recent years. Between base appropriations and the One Big Beautiful Bill passed in 2025, the Department of Defense expects FY2026 defense spending to exceed $1 trillion. This April, the FY2027 request came in even higher: $1.1 trillion in base spending, plus an additional $350 billion sought through another reconciliation bill. Taken together, defense spending would climb nearly 44 percent above FY2026 levels. A new era of defense spending seemed to be dawning.
Yet, as I noted in earlier writing for War on the Rocks, Congress is the body ultimately responsible for spending decisions, and the odds of enacting an increase of this magnitude were always long. Congressional Republicans may be more receptive to higher defense spending, but their ranks include a sizable contingent of deficit hawks. In exchange for supporting an increase, those deficit hawks would have demanded cuts to non-defense spending, whether discretionary accounts or mandatory programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, that more moderate Republicans would have resisted. The 2025 reconciliation bill navigated this tension through large tax cuts that the entire caucus could support, paired with higher defense and border security spending alongside significant cuts to discretionary and mandatory programs that moderates could accept.
In an election year, when members are wary of casting potentially controversial votes, an even larger defense increase ($350 billion, up from last year’s $151 billion) was always going to be difficult to pass. Even traditional defense hawks such as former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell had reservations about routing such a large share of the defense budget through reconciliation. Reconciliation funds, which sit outside the normal appropriations process, are far harder for Congress to control and steer. Balking at the full request, the House did begin work on a smaller reconciliation package aimed at funding combat operations in Iran, but it relies on different money than the FY2027 reconciliation request and leaves room for only $60 billion in defense spending. It remains the only viable vehicle for a potential lame-duck push.
After the 2026 midterms, the already difficult legislative math is compounded by two additional problems: the limits of the legislative calendar and the challenge of keeping focus among members who have been voted out of office. The razor-thin margins of the 119th Congress, a two-vote edge in the House and a three-vote edge in the Senate, will be tested as departing members clear out their offices and begin to look toward life after Congress.
The lame-duck calendar is unforgiving, with only five scheduled legislative work weeks remaining before the 119th Congress ends. In that window, Congress must work through a long list of must-pass and pending measures, including the National Defense Authorization Act, the farm bill, funding for Iran operations, the lapsed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorization, permitting reform, college sports reform, several other expiring authorizations (the Export-Import Bank and highway funding among them), and most critically, the December 11 expiration of the current continuing resolution. Failing to pass that last measure would trigger a government shutdown. The administration can press hard for a reconciliation bill, but it would compete with all of these priorities for floor time.
Passing a full reconciliation bill takes time. First, both the House and Senate would need to agree on a budget resolution. In the Senate, that would mean a potentially exhausting “vote-a-rama” on a series of Democratic amendments. The committees named in the resolution would then have to draft and pass their individual pieces of legislation, and matching legislation would have to clear both chambers. While none of this is subject to the filibuster, it would demand that Republicans in both chambers hold together throughout the process. Given their slim margins, the calendar would normally be the chief obstacle, but in the wake of the midterm results, attendance problems are all but certain.
The full results of the 2026 midterms are still being tallied, but the broad picture is clear: Democrats will have gained between eight and nine Senate seats and flipped at least 40 House seats. Those figures also understate the turnover. In the Senate, between 13 and 15 members will depart once retirements and primary losses are factored in. In the House, that number will almost certainly top 50 and could climb above 60 departing Republicans.
It is hard to overstate how much harder members who have lost or are leaving will be to whip in support of a bill. While senators are afforded the courtesy of keeping their offices until January, I know from personal experience that the House typically clears members out of their offices by December 1. Members who are job hunting or weighing their next move will have little appetite to linger for a measure they may not feel strongly about. That reluctance is magnified for those who have slept in their offices and will now have to arrange hotels or other lodging.
Taken together, these factors make it exceedingly difficult to see a path forward for the $350 billion reconciliation bill. Defense budget watchers should instead turn their attention to the upcoming appropriations negotiations.
FY2027 Appropriations: What Can and Will Congress Authorize?
A realistic FY2027 appropriations deal would set defense spending at $1.1 trillion, matched by comparable growth in discretionary non-defense spending. A $1.1 trillion base defense budget would still represent roughly a 10 percent increase over total FY2026 spending and would appear attainable, provided Congressional Republicans accept higher non-defense discretionary spending. Even if final appropriations slip into the 120th Congress next year, a spending deal is still likely, since Senate Democrats will not have the votes to overcome a Republican filibuster.
Beyond topline figures, these negotiations will center on policy riders and on how Congress responds to the administration’s use of pocket rescissions to circumvent legislative intent. Pocket rescissions are a novel tactic employed by the Office of Management and Budget, in which the administration asks Congress to approve rescissions but with less time remaining in the fiscal year than the statute allows for disapproval, then treats congressional silence as consent.
Questions for the Defense Industry
Two major, unresolved questions carry significant implications for the defense industry: what will be cut to accommodate the administration’s reconciliation priorities, and will Congress accept those cuts or impose its own preferences?
The administration placed many of the Pentagon’s top priorities inside the reconciliation budget, and those programs are now at risk. Several large defense-wide programs exist almost entirely within the reconciliation request: the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group ($53.6 billion), Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment ($40.6 billion), a sovereign AI arsenal ($34 billion), Defense Production Act purchases ($30 billion), and the Office of Strategic Capital Loan Program ($20 billion). The reconciliation request also carried the bulk of the funding for Golden Dome, much of the money intended to drive expansion of missile industrial capacity, and nearly half of the year’s F-35 funding ($5 billion of $11 billion).
In fairness, part of the appeal of reconciliation funding is the greater flexibility it gives the department. Under existing budget law, money passed through reconciliation is treated as “mandatory” spending and is therefore exempt from normal appropriations requirements. That freedom allows the department to deploy the money more flexibly and limits Congress’s ability to redirect it. Moving these funds into regular appropriations would forfeit those advantages, forcing the money to flow through the standard budget request with the full oversight that entails.
Many of these programs, particularly the large defense-wide efforts listed above, enjoy limited support on Capitol Hill and will likely face substantial reductions. By contrast, many weapon system programs command strong backing and could see more modest cuts. Golden Dome and the Trump-class battleship (which was not funded through reconciliation) are two more contentious programs whose fate will hinge largely on the outcome of congressional negotiations.
The Fate of the Iran Supplemental Funding Request
Alongside the questions surrounding the FY2027 defense topline and the reconciliation bill, the Pentagon has submitted an $87.6 billion supplemental request to cover the costs of the Iran war. Neither chamber has acted on it, though the House’s reconciliation bill framed its $60 billion increase as aligned with the supplemental request, which included funding for munitions, cyber, unmanned systems, and higher operations and maintenance costs. Should Congress fail to move the munitions investment from the reconciliation bill into the base budget, a supplemental could help offset those cuts. But given the Iran war’s pronounced unpopularity and its effect on the midterms, the prospects for a supplemental appear dim. While there is likely bipartisan recognition of strained operations and maintenance accounts and the sizable reprogramming requests they generate, it is difficult to imagine a bill funding operations in Iran advancing in the current political climate.
What Another Continuing Resolution Would Mean for Industry
The most likely outcome of the lame-duck negotiations is another continuing resolution extending funding into calendar year 2027. Under a continuing resolution, the department could keep funding existing programs at levels consistent with FY2026 appropriations ($857.6 billion) and continue disbursing the $151.5 billion provided by the One Big Beautiful Bill. New programs, however, would be limited to those explicitly authorized by the text of the continuing resolution, and spending ramps that had not previously been appropriated would be put on hold. The National Defense Authorization Act, which has cleared both chambers’ armed services committees, will likely pass before the holidays and may offer some insight into future FY2027 spending, but it will not unlock any funding without final appropriations.
Over the past few years, private capital has poured major investments into the evolving and expanding defense tech ecosystem as the topline budget and the Pentagon’s priority list have swelled. With the reconciliation budget now dead, industry and investors must reckon with the reality that the U.S. defense market, while still likely to grow significantly, will not see the rapid, hockey-stick growth some had anticipated. That shift will create real risks for many of these new entrants.
The Defense Autonomous Warfare Group program illustrates the point. In the budget request, it would receive a total of $54.8 billion in FY2027, of which $53.6 billion sits in the reconciliation bill and just $1 billion in the base budget. If the program is sharply cut to fit within the topline, as now appears likely, the pool of funding potentially available to the Drone Dominance program (which the program absorbed under FY2027) will be far smaller. Rather than a flexible pool of reconciliation money, the department will have to work through the normal budget process under closer congressional oversight.
FY2027 spending at the base level of $1.1 trillion would still represent nearly 10 percent year-over-year growth from FY2026. But as I have observed before, as control over limited funding shifts from the Pentagon to Congress, the composition of that spending may tilt more toward traditional prime and mid-tier contractors than the budget alone would suggest. The department will need to ensure that the private investment helping to expand the industrial base does not react adversely to the slowdown in topline spending. Otherwise, the coming years could bring a wave of consolidation as private capital retreats and smaller firms struggle to bridge the gap between their early development efforts and the slow-moving budget process.
Matt Vallone is director of market intelligence at Renaissance Strategic Advisors, a leading specialist in aerospace, defense, and government sector strategy consulting and mergers and acquisitions advisory. In the past, he worked at Next Frontier Intelligence, Avascent, and Janes. Vallone has worked in the U.S. House and Senate and served as the legislative director for Rep. Carol Shea-Porter.
**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.
Image: Petty Officer 1st Class Eric Brann via DVIDS.
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