Saturday, November 21, 2026

Pakistan gained international attention earlier this year for helping ease tensions between the United States and Iran. When it joined the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement in August, some analysts questioned whether its role as a neutral mediator had been compromised. That criticism overlooked an important detail: Pakistan had already signed a bilateral defense agreement with Saudi Arabia before the trilateral pact was concluded. Even so, both Tehran and Washington continued to accept Pakistan as a mediator. Although Oman and Qatar also possessed extensive mediation experience and strong ties to both capitals, Pakistan was ultimately the preferred partner.

In recent weeks, another impression took shape: that Iran was intentionally moving away from Pakistan. This view was based on three developments. First, Iran did not include Pakistan in the initial list of countries whose vessels were permitted passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Second, a Qatari liquefied natural gas tanker destined for Pakistan was attacked by unidentified assailants in the Gulf on October 30, despite Iran having approved its transit at Pakistan’s request. Third, Pakistan temporarily closed its overland trade route with Iran. Some critics suggested that the closure reflected Pakistan’s attempt to align with tighter U.S. sanctions and that Islamabad had been unable to resist American pressure.

Pakistan has tense borders with India and Afghanistan and cannot afford tension on its other two, with China and Iran.

-Javed Hafeez

Most of these concerns were based on misperceptions. India, China, Qatar, and Iraq received exemptions because of urgent requirements. According to Iranian lawmaker Ahmad Hayat-Moghaddam, India’s exemption was intended to maintain the flow of medicine into Iran, while China’s reflected Beijing’s political backing. China is also a major purchaser of Iranian oil. Qatar and Iran share one of the world’s largest gas fields beneath the Gulf. Iraq, meanwhile, is closely connected to Iran through a long border, aligned religious leadership, and a shared interest in preventing Kurdish separatism. Pakistan had already been included on Iran’s March list of friendly states allowed passage, and several Qatari LNG cargoes bound for Pakistan had since crossed with Iranian clearance. There was therefore no need to add Pakistan to the newer list.

The overland trade route was closed for security reasons. The Pakistan-Iran border is porous and has long been used for smuggling drugs and people, as well as for aiding criminal networks on both sides. The route reopened after one week.

Strong bilateral ties remain a strategic necessity for both countries. Pakistan already faces difficult relations with India and Afghanistan and cannot afford instability with its other neighbors, China and Iran. Pakistan also shares deep cultural, linguistic, and ethnic connections with Iran. The relationship has endured several difficult periods, including the Iran-Iraq war.

On November 15 and 16, Islamabad hosted the Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization, with Iran represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. If relations had been seriously strained, Tehran could have dispatched a lower-level representative. The joint communique issued at the meeting, which Iran endorsed, supported the mediation efforts of Pakistan and Qatar. Qatar is currently playing an active mediating role with Pakistan’s support. Part of Doha’s leverage stems from approximately $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue transferred to Qatari banks under a 2023 U.S.-Iran prisoner swap, funds that have remained frozen since. Releasing those assets in exchange for Iran accepting international inspections of its nuclear sites could prove crucial to breaking the current deadlock.

Saudi Arabia enjoys considerable popularity in Pakistan, and the mutual defense agreement with Riyadh, followed by the trilateral pact, has been well received domestically. In Iran, public opinion has been more mixed, but Tehran has raised no formal objection. Foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said in August that Iran did not view the pact as threatening and instead interpreted it as a sign that regional states were reassessing their dependence on the United States. On October 26, a high-level delegation from the three member states, including Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, Pakistan’s army chief, and Turkiye’s intelligence chief, was received warmly in Tehran, where Iran emphasized its preference for a regional security framework. On September 22, during an online event organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif expressed support for the Makkah pact.

Pakistan and Iran need one another for several reasons. As long as Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan remains hostile, Iran will be Islamabad’s only overland route to Turkiye and Central Asia. Their shared border can be managed effectively only through joint action against terrorism. Furthermore, if Iranian gas exports to India via pipeline ever become feasible, Pakistan would be the sole overland transit country. Such a pipeline would benefit both nations and help build mutual trust.

There was a time when Persian was widely studied and understood in Pakistan. That tradition should be revived. Thousands of Pakistanis travel to Iran for pilgrimage, but few Iranians visit Pakistan. Sports and cultural exchanges can help bring the two societies closer: Pakistani dramas should be shown in Iran, Iranian films in Pakistan, and Islamabad must maintain regular engagement with Tehran at the governmental level.

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