For nearly a decade, the United Nations’ most visible presence in the Sahel was its peacekeeping operation in Mali.
The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. At the request of Mali’s transitional government, the mandate was terminated in June 2023, and the mission completed its withdrawal by the end of that year.
The end of MINUSMA, however, did not mean a complete UN withdrawal from the region.
The UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) continues the organisation’s political work, while other parts of the UN system remain engaged in humanitarian and development efforts.
What has changed is the political environment in which that engagement now occurs.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 29, 2025. The three countries have also strengthened cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), placing sovereignty and strategic autonomy at the heart of their political agenda.
Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions remain severe.
Displacement, insecurity, food shortages and other pressures continue to cross borders, even as governments increasingly insist on managing their security and political affairs according to their own priorities.
The central question is how much influence the UN can wield after losing the peacekeeping mission that once constituted its largest presence in the region.
What Does the UN’s Role Look Like Today?
The UN’s current presence is defined less by troops and more by diplomacy, mediation, humanitarian assistance and development.
UNOWAS is a special political mission rather than a peacekeeping operation. Its work encompasses preventive diplomacy, good offices, mediation, conflict prevention and support for political dialogue.
“The influence the UN can actually exercise is narrow. The AES states have stripped away the mechanisms that once gave outside institutions leverage, leaving ECOWAS and the Rome Statute, and building their own confederation and joint force instead,” said Mubarak Aliyu, a political and security analyst in Nigeria.
In February 2026, the Security Council extended UNOWAS’s mandate until January 31, 2029, while requesting an independent strategic review of its mandate and activities by September 30, 2026.
The review is taking place as military governments, emerging regional alliances and a renewed emphasis on sovereignty reshape West Africa’s political landscape.
Russia has also become a significant factor in the region’s changing security environment.
“What has actually shaped events this year is Russia’s Africa Corps, which helped Mali’s and Niger’s military governments survive shocks the UN was never positioned to influence, functioning mainly as regime protection rather than counterinsurgency,” Aliyu said.
![UN continues its engagement in a Sahel where governments are placing greater emphasis on sovereignty and strategic autonomy [File photo: Timothy A. Clary / AFP]]()
“Moscow’s leverage extends into the Security Council chamber too, since its veto shapes what collective action the Council can attempt on Mali in the first place.”
Kabir Adamu, founder and managing director of Abuja-based Beacon Security and Innovations Limited, which provides security solutions in Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, said the UN should move away from large troop deployments and focus more on diplomatic and development solutions.
“Looking ahead, the UN’s priorities in the Sahel should promote effective security sector governance and security sector reform. This will mean pivoting from traditional, large-scale peacekeeping to deep-rooted and core preventive strategies and diplomacy that addresses the root causes of fragility, conflict and violence, as well as instability,” Adamu said.
Diplomacy has become increasingly important for the UN as Sahelian governments pursue alternative security partnerships and regional arrangements.
How Sovereignty Has Reshaped the Political Landscape
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have placed sovereignty and strategic autonomy at the centre of their political outlook and developed the AES as a platform for closer cooperation.
Their departure from ECOWAS has altered the regional architecture traditionally used by West African governments to address political and security crises.
The UN continues to work with regional bodies, including ECOWAS and the African Union, but governments no longer operate within a shared political framework or follow the same approach to external partnerships.
This fragmentation has made the maintenance of essential political channels more challenging for the UN.
Adamu said the organisation should work with and through regional bodies and security groups rather than create another large-scale force of its own.
“As national security structures remain weak and extractive, and regional security architecture fragments, marked by the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States and shifting ECOWAS dynamics, the UN should prioritise pragmatic, inclusive mediation to bridge divides between Sahelian and coastal states, while actively bolstering alternative, functioning frameworks like MNJTF [Multinational Joint Task] and the Accra Initiative,” he said.
The Sahel’s Challenges Remain Unresolved
The departure of peacekeepers has not eliminated the crises that prompted international organisations to become involved in the region.
Displacement, armed violence, organised crime, food insecurity and climate-related pressures continue to intersect across the Sahel.
Climate change may not be the sole cause of instability, but environmental and economic strains can intensify existing vulnerabilities, particularly where state institutions are weak and communities are already confronting conflict and displacement.
Humanitarian assistance remains one of the main areas in which the UN can continue operating, even when governments oppose large-scale international military involvement.
These efforts also place greater importance on local and regional capacity.
“Crucially, the UN must double down on the core UNISS pillars of governance, resilience, and security by integrating climate-peace initiatives and empowering local capacities, ensuring that international engagement remains flexible, locally owned, and focused on sustainable, multidimensional stability rather than solely militarised responses,” Adamu said.
Although the UN cannot dictate sovereign governments’ security partnerships or impose political processes on authorities that reject them, it can still facilitate dialogue, support humanitarian operations and bring regional crises to the attention of the wider international community.
What UNGA 81 Means for the Sahel
The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 8, 2026, with the General Debate scheduled to begin on September 22.
The assembly is meeting without a UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger outside ECOWAS, while the AES has emerged as a separate framework for their political and security cooperation.
“That leaves the UN closer to an advocate and service provider than a shaper of outcomes,” Aliyu said. “It can report, brief, fund aid operations and press for access, but it cannot compel it or offer the regime security that has made Russia indispensable to the military governments.”
Nevertheless, insecurity, displacement, humanitarian needs and economic and climate-related pressures persist across the Sahel.
In this transformed regional environment, the UN’s influence is more likely to depend on diplomacy than military force, access rather than authority, and regional relationships instead of a large international security presence.
