Commercial cloud architecture has made digital infrastructure more resilient to localized disruption. Geographic dispersion, workload migration, and failover allow providers to maintain access during degradation or even destruction. Yet this resilience rests on interlocking dependencies—energy, supply chains, and governing bodies—that reach far beyond the data centers themselves. The United States is expanding digital capacity, including data centers and their supporting systems, faster than governance frameworks can coordinate the public agencies, private operators, and physical infrastructure on which that capacity depends. These dependencies exceed what any single hyperscale operator can address alone and require state-level coordination across the physical systems, commercial interests, and jurisdictions that sustain digital capacity.
I previously described data centers as the decisive infrastructure of the 21st century—exposed and unaccounted for in real doctrine. Frameworks such as the Pentagon’s Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability and its successor, the Unified Cloud Marketplace, require providers to disperse workloads across data centers hundreds of miles apart and build failover into contracts, even as the Pentagon diversifies across commercial hyperscale providers. This framework must expand to address the rapid infrastructure expansion that risks outpacing the geographic dispersion needed to protect data survivability.
Writing for Cogs of War in July, Blake Herzinger offered the strongest case yet for digital strategic depth, built on three pillars: dispersion, elasticity, and optionality—engineered so a workload can survive an attack on any single point. He cites two recent cases. In Ukraine, critical workloads were shifted to allied cloud infrastructure during wartime, showing how geographic dispersion can preserve data access even when domestic infrastructure is under attack. Earlier this year, when Iran struck Amazon Web Services facilities in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain—the first confirmed kinetic attack on public commercial cloud infrastructure—customers failed over into other regions, demonstrating the scale of commercial cloud architecture. Yet this strategic depth is resilience temporarily rented. The cloud that delivered Bahrain a “cloud first” solution could not provide security independent of the physical infrastructure beneath it.
In September, Amazon Web Services announced it could no longer restore access to resources and data hosted exclusively in its Bahrain region after physical damage spread across multiple availability zones, exceeding what its regional and multi-zone architecture was “designed to withstand.” In the United Arab Emirates, AWS made the same determination for one of three availability zones while recovery continues in the other two. The dispersion that mitigated the initial strike could not indefinitely outrun the physical damage on the ground.
Hyperscalers would counter that multi-region failover, capacity planning, and supply chain management are their core business—and that they perform it better than any government could. They would note that Bahrain was a single attack, with customers moving workloads to other regions as designed. But what happens when multiple regions, including failover destinations, are exposed to multi-theater conflict? Customer failover depends on strained transmission access and the same fiber, supply chains, and host governments—none of which a hyperscale provider controls.
Failover regions do not guarantee operational independence. In June 2025, a single faulty update crashed Google Cloud’s policy-checking system across every region within seconds, disrupting Google Cloud and Google Workspace worldwide. Google Cloud is one of the Pentagon’s four Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability providers. Global physical links share similar single points of failure. Subsea cables in the Persian Gulf—including Asia-Africa-Europe 1, FALCON, and the Gulf Bridge System—run through the Strait of Hormuz. In October 2026, two senior Iranian security officials told Reuters that Tehran had drawn up plans to target the Gulf’s undersea cables if the United States and Israel resume attacks, and to prevent repairs in order to prolong disruption. Moving a workload to another region does not remove it from these shared physical dependencies.
Scale to the Moon: The Physical Limits of Dispersion
Is bigger better? A larger, more geographically distributed data center footprint means more substations, transmission lines, and fiber routes over land and sea—all of which the state must protect as scaling continues. Dispersion compounds nearly every constraint on scaling, from security and energy to space and resources.
Every new site requires new transmission, and transmission equipment is currently on backorder. The Department of Energy’s July 2026 transmission study identified data centers as a major source of new load and found an urgent need for additional capacity. The International Energy Agency estimates that grid constraints alone could delay roughly 20 percent of global data center capacity planned through 2030. The backup queue continues to grow, further distancing the goal of wider scaling.
The same bottlenecks appear outside the United States. In Brazil, data centers can be built in two years, while the transmission lines to power them take five to seven years. In Chile, the constraint is water availability. Google’s Quilicura Facility used roughly 461 million liters of water in 2024 during a drought now exceeding a decade, intensifying pressure on local supplies. Across Europe, developers are moving farther from major cities as power and land grow scarce. These constraints are affecting development now, not just in the 2030s, as seen in Microsoft’s recently cancelled 50-megawatt data center lease in the United Kingdom due to grid connection delays.
New data centers require hardware that is already becoming scarce. Utilities are competing for transformers, breakers, and switchgear, with some high-voltage transformer lead times exceeding 160 weeks. Expansion is straining supplies of critical minerals and rare earths, whose geographic concentration and refinement reside primarily in China.
Concentrated control of critical minerals gives Beijing leverage over data center development. Demand for gallium alone could reach 10 percent of global supply by 2030, while China produces 98–99 percent of it. Copper and lithium supply gaps are projected into the next decade. China banned exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States in December 2024, then suspended the ban after the Busan trade truce while retaining licensing requirements. The suspension expires on November 27, 2026, and the truce itself—extended in September—runs only to January 10, 2027. That expiration will reveal the extent and willingness of Beijing to use this leverage.
Expanded interconnection nodes needed to connect dispersed data centers become easy targets as bottlenecks increase alongside scaling. Dispersion changes the adversary’s calculus. A hardened hyperscale campus is an expensive target, but the substation feeding it or the fiber route connecting to it is far easier to strike. Russia’s suspected Baltic Sea cable sabotage, carried out by commercial vessels, has shown what cheap, low-tech tactics can do against critical infrastructure. Holding states—or individuals—accountable has proven difficult. A Finnish court dismissed charges against three officers of the tanker Eagle S in October 2025 for lack of jurisdiction. The Helsinki Court of Appeal overturned that ruling in August 2026 and sent the case back for trial, but the officers have since left the country, making prosecution unlikely. Yet even as cheap tactics target expanded nodes, states have not shied away from direct data center attacks. Ukraine’s recent strike on the Yandex data center in Russia exemplifies a new normalization of attacks on data centers following the incidents in the Gulf.
A sustained multi-theater conflict would test the resilience of supply chains, fiber-optic interconnection, and power generation, with consequences for data center infrastructure. Digital infrastructure scaling intended to provide security through dispersion risks creating new strategic vulnerabilities by deepening the very dependencies that a multi-theater conflict would expose and strain. Capacity built during peacetime does not guarantee resilience in wartime. Failover architecture assumes inter-region connections will survive—a premise that sustained, multi-theater conflict would fundamentally undermine.
From New York to Malaysia: The Shifting Ground of Cross-Border Governance
The assumption that dispersion can effortlessly fail over into more regions is being challenged. Hyperscalers face a mix of power rules, water constraints, environmental standards, tax incentives, and community obligations in every market. As computing power grows more strategically important, these differences will determine not only where companies build, but which governments will host them and on what terms—and where failover capacity can exist at all.
Data residency rules make the problem more acute. Many Amazon Web Services customers in the Gulf—including government agencies, financial institutions, and healthcare providers—must by law keep data within sovereign borders. As TeleGeography noted after the strikes, those customers “couldn’t legally move their data to a functioning international region to restore their services” even as most customers migrated workloads successfully. That distinction explains why some data existed only in Bahrain when the region was lost. Rules like these can make failover illegal, and no provider can engineer around that.
In July, New York Governor Kathy Hochul imposed a statewide moratorium of up to one year on new hyperscale data centers while the state develops standards around infrastructure costs, environmental impacts, and community benefits. Texas broadened its moratorium on data center approvals, ordering the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality to halt permits, and several other states have active legislative moratorium proposals. Failover candidates are being removed from the map or arriving with conditions.
Outside the United States, a shifting landscape of physical limitations directly affects cross-border governance. Malaysia offers a different response to industry pressures. Rather than halting data center construction outright, Johor has restricted the most water-intensive classes of data centers, with federal and state governments tightening project reviews against available power and water. Brazil created a new tax regime to attract investment while attaching domestic investment and sustainability conditions, and Chile has formalized environmental review criteria specifically for data centers. The industry faces targeted restrictions in one market, conditional incentives in another, and environmental constraints in a third. Each divergence reshapes the geography of where failover can go during a crisis.
Public-Private Orchestration
In March, the U.S. Army began negotiations to lease land at Fort Bliss and Dugway Proving Grounds to Carlyle and CyrusOne for data center development. Meanwhile, Congress began legislating on physical and supply chain risks, including a House provision that would bar the Defense Department from leasing land for data centers unless developers agree not to install equipment containing components manufactured in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. The Pentagon moved ahead with public-private infrastructure while Congress was still developing the rules to govern it.
The moment calls for proactive orchestration, and the Pentagon has done it before. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, and the Cable Security Fleet give the military priority access to commercial airliners, satellites, and cable-repair capacity during national emergencies. Though each confers different authorities, all depend on private capacity being available for national security in a crisis. Cloud infrastructure is no different, yet no such equivalent currently exists. The Department of Defense should establish a Commercial Compute Reserve with crisis priority. Such a reserve would give the United States what no hyperscaler can engineer alone: guaranteed access to commercial capacity during a crisis.
This cannot be done simply, however; insurance presents a broader set of issues. Commercial insurers can suspend war-risk coverage on short notice. Under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Federal Aviation Administration’s war-risk insurance program covers carriers flying government missions. A Compute Reserve would require similar parameters, but against far larger infrastructure losses than individual aircraft.
A reserve would not guarantee survival—that depends on hardening and the energy, fiber optics, and supply chains supporting the cloud. Some loss is inevitable in sustained conflict, so the reserve’s purpose would be continuity and reconstitution. When a region is lost, the reserve would determine who receives remaining capacity, on terms agreed in peacetime. Participating providers would maintain a contracted baseline of standby capacity for defense workloads, enough to absorb an initial relocation. Beyond that, they would agree to preempt commercial workloads only after a declared emergency, activating additional capacity incrementally—following the Civil Reserve Air Fleet model. The Telecommunications Service Priority program, the closest existing analog, shows how such an order could be established. It prioritizes communications supporting national security and emergency preparedness, including eligible healthcare, public safety, and financial-sector functions. The reserve should preserve those priorities, protecting designated civilian services from preemption as more capacity is activated. Because the first regions lost may be abroad, the reserve should extend to allied countries. It should also build on the Defense Production Act’s priority ratings, which already place defense contracts ahead of commercial orders, extending that logic to guaranteed access to existing commercial capacity during a crisis.
Airlines commit aircraft to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in exchange for Defense Department business, but that dynamic does not extend to the cloud. For hyperscalers, that business is too small to secure the same commitment. By 2025, the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability drew roughly $3.9 billion split among four providers, while Amazon Web Services alone annualized more than $180 billion in revenue. A reserve should draw on what hyperscalers need and what the federal government controls: land and energy. Participation should earn expedited power and permitting on federal sites such as Fort Bliss and Dugway Proving Grounds—where reserve terms could be written into leases now under negotiation—or Energy Department sites already offered for AI data center development. Congress should support this effort with indemnification against catastrophic loss, using Defense Production Act authorities as a backstop if voluntary participation falls short.
The United States currently recognizes 16 critical infrastructure sectors. Data centers fall within both the information technology and communications sectors, but neither is organized around data centers’ physical dependence on energy, cooling, and protection from kinetic attack. Congress and the executive branch should create a standalone sector reflecting a defense establishment increasingly dependent on commercial computing power, with its own sector risk management agency and a sector plan built around those dependencies. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency already manages risk for both existing sectors and is a natural lead, with the Energy Department as a partner on energy. However, the agency has lost a third of its staff since January 2025 and would need that gap restored to assume the role. Designation alone would not impose standards, since sector risk management is largely voluntary coordination. Britain’s 2024 designation showed the same limits, giving operators a dedicated government team, priority access to the National Cyber Security Centre, and coordinated emergency support—but no minimum security or resilience requirements. Britain is now legislating those requirements through its Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, requiring data centers of one megawatt or more to manage risk and report major incidents. Congress should pair an American designation with the same obligations from the start.
Following the strikes in March 2026, the United Arab Emirates began considering dispersed, underground, and blast-resistant designs for its five-gigawatt AI data center. The Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability shows that resilience can be procured at scale. The Defense Department’s chief information officer should direct the Defense Information Systems Agency to write physical resilience standards against deliberate attacks into requirements for dedicated government and classified regions and into future Unified Cloud Marketplace task orders—covering on-site power, redundant fiber-optic and satellite paths, and stocked replacement components. Providers would accept these standards because those regions serve government customers, where department leverage is greater and costs can be priced into contracts. Commercial regions would join through the reserve’s incentives, not by mandate. This is not about making every data center a fortress, but about ensuring—beyond what private industry guarantees alone—that when one power source, supplier, or communication path fails, capabilities do not fail with it.
The Missing Doctrine
The rapid expansion of commercial cloud architecture has created fundamental security issues for the Pentagon: scaling capacity is deepening operational dependencies that are increasingly difficult to defend during a crisis. Cloud resilience is a hallmark of 21st-century computing security and can absorb localized disruptions, but a sustained multi-theater conflict will overwhelm physical infrastructure if defense strategy relies solely on buildout.
The United States should develop a framework capable of coordinating the physical infrastructure, industrial supply chains, commercial operators, and public authorities that make computing power resilient in the first place: the ground beneath the cloud. The Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability and the emerging Unified Cloud Marketplace demonstrate that public-private orchestration is possible at the procurement layer. The harder task is extending that coordination across energy, infrastructure, supply chains, and security policy.
To keep failover migration available during wartime, the Defense Department and private industry require a joint doctrine anchored by a Commercial Compute Reserve, a dedicated critical infrastructure sector, and physical resilience standards written into government cloud contracts. The U.S. shortfall is the lack of a dynamic doctrine capable of governing the underlying systems reshaping modern digital warfare.


