In January 2026, Iran experienced some of its largest protests in decades, prompting the government to cut off internet access.
The US‑based monitoring organization IODA (Internet Outage Detection and Analysis) recorded virtually no traffic, and analyst Doug Madory called the shutdown “one of the largest government‑directed communication outages in history.”
During the protests, thousands of people were killed or arrested, and the exact casualty count remains unknown. Death‑toll estimates range from 7,000 to 40,000, with many observers suggesting the higher figure. The opacity is largely due to the blackout, which prevented communication with the outside world.
This pattern repeats in other authoritarian states such as Russia, Belarus, Myanmar and Sudan, where governments weaponise internet blackouts to suppress dissent by cutting off communication.
Radio-powered networks
LoRa, short for “long range,” operates on a simple principle originally developed for industrial applications. Low‑power radio modules — also called LoRa transmitters — are often integrated into microchips that power devices requiring extended battery life and wide coverage for small data payloads, such as smoke detectors, smart water or power meters, and environmental sensors.
These devices transmit over license‑free radio frequencies also used by weather stations and garage door openers.
To build an internet‑free network, users must purchase a LoRa transmitter, which typically costs between €30 ($35) and €80 ($91). The transmitter is then paired with a smartphone using dedicated software.
The devices send encrypted data packets up to several kilometres. Each node forwards messages to the next, creating a self‑healing routing path: if a node fails, traffic is rerouted through alternative nodes.
Consequently, a LoRa mesh network forms a decentralized communication infrastructure that cannot be shut down by a central authority, and devices can be concealed and powered by batteries or small solar panels.
Two well‑known open‑source platforms that support this type of communication are Meshtastic and MeshCore, both available at no cost.
Both emphasize strong data protection: the devices simply forward messages without being able to read their content, and third parties — including law enforcement — cannot intercept the traffic.
MeshCore’s motto is “your communications, your keys, your control.”
Demonstrations of the technology’s resilience have occurred in Ukraine, where Meshstastic-UA provides a live map of active nodes, many positioned near the front lines.
LoRa mesh networks cannot be censored; when governments block the internet, they typically target IP addresses and domains, inspect data packets, and compel service providers to cooperate.
For example, Russian security agencies require domestic telecom operators to provide direct access to communications, threatening license revocation if they refuse — measures that are effective only when traffic travels over the internet.
In contrast, LoRa traffic moves via radio waves, bypassing firewalls and surveillance systems.
Only smaller messages, no pictures
The principal limitation of such a network is that, unlike the regular internet, communication is limited to brief messages of roughly 237 bytes — about the size of a short text message.
Nevertheless, transmitting less data enables longer range, lower power consumption, and a reduced chance of radio signals being intercepted or located.
Mesh networks imperfect
There are still risks. While encryption hides message content, it does not conceal the transmitter’s location; authorities with appropriate equipment can triangulate radio signals to pinpoint the device within a limited radius.
In some jurisdictions, operating unauthorized radio equipment is illegal. In Iran or Russia, possessing such devices can lead to severe legal consequences.
Starlink and the fight for Internet access in Iran
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Other mesh networks, such as those that use mobile phones as transmitters, require sufficient node density to function; insufficient nodes limit range, and building a dense network takes time that may not be available during crises.
It is unclear whether anti‑government activists in authoritarian regimes actually employ LoRa mesh networks, as participants typically wish to keep such involvement hidden.
Ukraine has shown the concept works in practice. The required hardware and software are freely available worldwide, and the technology is mature enough for users without extensive technical expertise to set up themselves.
In an era where governments increasingly wield the internet as a tool of power and companies like Apple face growing regulatory pressure, alternative communication methods may be essential. Networks of small radio modules could provide a solution for some.
