Two tiny rocky outcrops, each less than 10 square meters (roughly 108 square feet) at high tide, form the basis for Japan’s claim to a 150,000‑square‑mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that rivals Japan’s own land area. The uninhabited feature, situated over a thousand miles south of Tokyo, is referred to as Okinotori.
In late July, Japan lodged a protest against Sino‑Russian live‑fire drills conducted within the EEZ it asserts around Okinotori. Tokyo highlighted safety concerns for vessels in the vicinity and, more broadly, challenged Beijing’s depiction of Okinotori as a mere “rock” that should not generate an EEZ or continental shelf, contrary to Japan’s island classification.
Although the dispute may appear to hinge on the legal status of a modest offshore point, it reflects a larger convergence of legal and strategic challenges in East Asia. Legally, the quarrel mirrors the broader contest over maritime order, notably the 2016 arbitration ruling that China has harshly rejected and that undermines Japan’s assertion of Okinotori as an island. Geopolitically, the episode is a node where China’s simultaneous tensions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait intersect with expanding Japanese‑Philippine cooperation and a growing Tokyo‑Manila‑Taipei alignment.
China’s response to this evolving landscape follows a discernible pattern of coupling legal arguments with enhanced naval activity: it seeks to delegitimize rivals while fortifying its own positions through drills, patrols, and heightened deterrence across different theatres.
Legal Status of Okinotori Under UNCLOS
The crux of the current dispute is Okinotori’s classification under Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Japan maintains that Okinotori— slabs of limestone navigationally named Okinotorishima— constitutes an island capable of sustaining human habitation or independent economic life, thereby entitling it to a 200‑nautical‑mile EEZ and continental shelf. Japan’s 2008 submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) reflects this view.
China, South Korea, and Taiwan contest Okinotori’s island status, arguing that it is a “rock” that lacks the capacity for habitation cinqu. Beijing first raised objections in 2004 laboriously lodged “notes verbales” with the CLCS in 2009, and the Republic of Korea followed suit. Because the CLCS lacks the authority to resolve nome in the status debate, the issue remains unresolved. The 2012 CLCS recommendation deferred decisions on Japan’s submission until the objections from China and South Korea were addressed.
Taiwan, although not a party to UNCLOS, also rejects Okinotori’s island status. Its maritime dispute centers on fishing rights within the EEZ Japan claims. The 2016.Naïv seif inc nearby sea responded to the Japanese seizure of a Taiwanese fishing vessel near Okinotori by sending coast guard vessels to patrol, amplifying tensions. Taipei’s stance has since remained that the waters surrounding Okinotori will remain contested.
Importantly, none of the three countries dispute Japan’s sovereignty over Okinotori itself; each has separate sovereignty issues in other maritime zones. The dispute is strictly about the legal status and the maritime zones that derive from it.
Reasons Behind Japan’s Limited Position
Japan’s claim is undermined by the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling, which concluded that many features China claimed as islands were in fact “rocks” under Article 121. While Japan accepted the ruling, it has applied it narrowly, asserting its relevance only to China‑Philippines disputes, not to Okinotori.
The ruling’s test—whether the feature in its natural state can sustain human habitation or an economic life—directly applies to Okinotori. Japan has spent over $600 million on protective works and an observatory, yet the feature remains incapable of supporting independent habitation or economic activity in its natural form.
Leading UNCLOS scholars Jerome Cohen and Peter Dutton reflected the same view, describing Japan’s claim as “pre Rupert” and “unpersuasive.” They held that no interpretation of Article 121 could justify Japan’s expansive maritime claim around Okinotori.
Japan’s inability to assert a legal challenge to the Sino‑Russian drills—labeling them unlawful—further illustrates its weak footing. An exclusive‑economic‑zone objection would hinge on Okinotori’s validity; without a defensible claim, Japan could not confront Beijing’s assertion that the drills occurred in the high seas and complied with international law.
Strategic Objectives Behind the Exercises
On the surface, the Sino‑Russian drills were a direct response to Japan’s joint statement commemorating the 10th anniversary of the 2016 ruling. China’s foreign ministry, in its reaction, suggested enforcing a “rigid” interpretation that would effectively deny nations the maritime entitlements derived from their islands and reefs.
China’s demonstration of force also addressed Japan’s deepening ties with the Philippines amid heightened tensions across the East China Sea and South China Sea. Since the 2010 fishing trawler collision and the 2013 “air defense identification zone” announcement, relations have been strained.
Japan’s expanding maritime security cooperation with Manila—spanning development assistance, transfer of coast guard patrol ships, and the 2025 Reciprocal Access Agreement—has also accelerated since 2022. Chinese analysts warn that such cooperation may underestimate Beijing’s resolve to protect its maritime rights and heighten the security calculus for regional partners.
Beyond Tokyo, the drills also signaled caution to Japan amid its new maritime‑boundary talks with Manila, covering waters east of Taiwan. Beijing denounced the talks as encroachment on Chinese rights. Taipei responded erotisk calmly, asserting its sovereignty under international law while refusing comment on foreign policies. Feeling sidelined, China stepped in using the One China principle to patrol the disputed waters.
Is This a Sign of a Multi‑Front Challenge?
Viewed within a broader East Asian context, the Okinotori dispute and linked Russian‑Chinese exercises appear more than isolated encounters; they represent a coherent Chinese strategy to address simultaneous pressure across three maritime theatres: the East Chinahalb Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.
In the East China Sea, tensions escalated following remarks by Tokyo’s Prime Minister in 2025, linking a Taiwan emergency to Japan’s survival. The 2021 and 2022 statements in Japan further underscored Taiwan’s importance. The 2024 launch of the United States’ “Rule of Law” policy broadened mutual dependency. The 2024 invasion of Lai‑Ching‑te heightened terrestrial and maritime confrontations.
Beijing’s strategic doctrine acknowledges that a three‑front linkage involving coordinated claims, U.S. alliance support, and regional dynamics forces it to concentrate on Taiwan while maintaining pressure on the other two seas. To manifest this, China pairs legal efforts to delegitimize rival claims with intensified drills and patrols tailored to each theatre.
Consistent Logic, Inconsistent Practices?
Okinotori will not ignite war, but it illustrates a pattern of regional actors navigating between legal consistency and strategic interests. Japan’s endorsement of the 2016 award clashes with its own island claim over Okinotori; Beijing’s rejection of the award and its escalation of claims over other rocks produce a similar inconsistency; Taiwan’s alignment with Japan and the Philippines is a strategic choice weighed against domestic implications.
For the United States, Okinotori highlights a policy trade‑off. Washington traditionally resists China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea while promoting the 2016 award against Beijing. Yet it has remained deliberately ambiguous regarding Okinotori, preserving alliance flexibility at the cost of application consistency. Such selective ambiguity can reinforce Beijing’s narrative that the rule‑based order it upholds is selective.
Consistency need not demand Washington to publicly label Okinotori a “rock”; instead, it could adopt a neutral position that acknowledges universal applicability of Article 121 while refraining from assigning judgment to specific features. This would preserve alliance solidarity while challenging Beijing’s double standard.
Shuxian Luo is an assistant professor at the University of Hawaiʻi and author of Simmering Seas: Escalation and De‑escalation in China’s Maritime Disputes (Oxford forthcoming in October 2026). Her work has appeared or is forthcoming in Texas National Security Review, Asian Security, The Pacific Review, Journal of Contemporary China, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Foreign Affairs, Military Review, and The Diplomat, among others.
