Why We Wrote This

With many hawkish China voices sidelined, the Trump administration lacks seasoned China experts, prompting questions about who is shaping U.S. policy toward Beijing. Other nations are watching closely as the dynamic shifts.

China is now viewed more positively than the United States in most of the 36 countries surveyed by Pew, reversing the 2023 trend. Factors fueling China’s soft‑power edge include the unpopularity of President Trump’s trade tariffs, his “America‑first” stance, and other controversial initiatives. Experts say the administration is ill‑prepared for this turning point, citing a shortage of strategic China specialists and a misreading of both the Xi‑Trump relationship and the broader U.S.–China rivalry.

“President Trump has tremendous optimism regarding his relationship with President Xi that unfortunately is not borne out by the historical record,” says Henrietta Levin, senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS. “Trump … sees Xi as a friend with whom he can solve big global problems,” rather than as a competitor to be managed with allies. This marks a sharp departure from the first Trump term’s harder‑line stance.

Trump’s Optimism on China

Mr. Trump has repeatedly floated a “G2” partnership between the U.S. and China, envisioning the two powers as equal global leaders. Beijing has yet to embrace that framing, emphasizing its own independent path while intensifying competition across the board.

“Regardless of whether the U.S. decides it wants to compete with China … China’s going to keep competing with the U.S.,” notes Ms. Levin, a former White House and State Department adviser.

The president is also focused on securing a comprehensive trade deal and expanding business opportunities, a priority highlighted by the large corporate delegation that accompanied him on his May trip to Beijing. A reciprocal summit with President Xi is slated for late September.

“Trump is viewing China through an economic lens. He is ‘Tariff Man’ and wants a bigger trade deal with China and is still chasing it,” explains Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute specializing in great‑power competition.

Julia Demaree Nikhinson/AP

President Donald Trump speaks with reporters before departing the White House in Washington for a trip to Beijing to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, May 12, 2026.

Who’s Setting U.S. China Policy?

President Trump’s decision‑making on China is described as ad‑hoc and lacking strategic depth by former officials. “The best way to get to the president is through the media or someone he likes, and hope you are the last person in the room,” says an anonymous Washington source familiar with the process.

Strategic planning has suffered due to the absence of Cabinet‑level leadership and senior officials with deep China expertise, a contrast to both the Biden administration and the first Trump term.

Early in his second term, Mr. Trump removed or reassigned several hawkish China hands from the National Security Council, including Michael Waltz, David Feith, and Alex Wong. Federal workforce reductions further eroded institutional knowledge, leaving remaining China experts underutilized and uncertain about the president’s objectives. “The NSC process is broken,” and the personnel handling China issues are relatively junior, says a former U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “That makes this China policy extremely inconsistent and not strategic.”

Beijing has also shifted its approach, capitalizing on the president’s America‑first rhetoric to drive wedges between the United States and its traditional allies. The Chinese government’s earlier “wolf warrior” diplomacy has given way to a narrative portraying China as a stable, responsible global actor.

That narrative is gaining ground, according to the Pew survey of more than 42,000 respondents worldwide. In only six of the 36 polled countries do more people view the U.S. favorably than China, with four of those—India, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—located in the Asia‑Pacific region.

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