South China Sea Code of Conduct: Substance Over Symbolism Needed for Lasting Stability

As ASEAN and China push to finalize a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea by 2026, the critical question extends beyond whether a deal can be struck. The true test is whether the agreement will materially ease tensions. An accord that fails to address the root causes of friction or modify claimant behavior will fall short of its purpose.

The South China Sea remains a flashpoint of overlapping claims involving China and four ASEAN members—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. For years, the two sides have negotiated a COC aimed at creating a rules-based framework to manage disputes, minimize miscalculation, and prevent armed conflict.

After nearly two decades of talks, the Philippines, serving as the current ASEAN chair, has indicated that consensus on the COC is within reach. While finalizing the text would mark a significant diplomatic milestone, the work cannot end there.

An agreement devoid of credible enforcement mechanisms, riddled with compliance ambiguities, or restrictive of Southeast Asian strategic autonomy would do little to resolve the region’s core security dilemmas.

Substance must take precedence over symbolism. A COC that merely rehashes the vague commitments to dialogue and restraint found in the existing Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) would offer limited practical utility. Instead, the code requires concrete procedures for incident management, dispute resolution, and violation accountability.

Militarization continues to accelerate. China has constructed a network of fortified outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, including facilities capable of hosting bomber aircraft. Meanwhile, Vietnam has expanded its own reclamation and infrastructure projects on occupied features to support a heavier military footprint.

Recurring confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels underscore the fragility of the status quo. Diplomatic pledges alone cannot ensure responsible conduct at sea.

For the COC to enhance stability, it must embed practical de-escalation measures and enforceable accountability standards.

A second hurdle lies in enforcement. Even with specific obligations, compliance will hinge on political will—especially when adherence clashes with national interests. ASEAN’s consensus-driven model, though vital for unity, often hampers unified responses to violations, given the bloc’s divergent economic and security ties with Beijing.

A credible framework must therefore mandate transparent incident reporting, mandatory consultations, and clear adjudication channels for alleged breaches. Regular review cycles and defined dispute-management pathways are essential to prevent escalation. Without such mechanisms, the COC risks devolving into a mere statement of intent.

The agreement must also safeguard the strategic autonomy of Southeast Asian nations. Beijing may push for clauses restricting activities it deems “destabilizing,” such as joint military exercises with the United States or other partners. Overly broad provisions governing defense cooperation or external engagement could constrain ASEAN members’ sovereign security choices far beyond the scope of maritime dispute management.

The challenge lies in distinguishing genuine confidence-building measures from restrictions on legitimate defense cooperation. Southeast Asian states must retain the freedom to conduct exercises, modernize forces, and forge external partnerships consistent with international law. A COC that curtails these rights would undermine the strategic independence ASEAN seeks to uphold.

The Philippines’ deepening defense ties with partners like Australia and Japan illustrate this tension. These partnerships bolster Manila’s deterrence posture and expand its response options, yet Beijing views them as fueling strategic competition, potentially complicating COC negotiations.

However, external engagement should not be treated as an impediment to the COC. Such partnerships can strengthen ASEAN’s bargaining leverage by demonstrating that regional security cannot be dictated solely by Beijing and the claimant states, given the waterway’s global economic importance. Still, extra-regional involvement must not eclipse ASEAN’s centrality in defining regional norms.

Ultimately, the COC’s legitimacy rests on balancing three imperatives: lowering tensions, enforcing compliance, and preserving Southeast Asian strategic autonomy. These goals are compatible, but achieving them demands precise drafting, robust implementation mechanisms, and the political resolve to confront violations consistently.

The ultimate metric of success is not the signing ceremony, but whether the agreement alters behavior on the water. Absent credible commitments and real accountability, the COC risks becoming a diplomatic trophy that fails to deliver the stability it promises.

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