Syria’s Calculated Restraint Toward Israel: Strategic Necessity or Strategic Trap?

Last week, Israel launched another attack on Syrian territory. Israeli forces shelled a hilltop near Beit Jinn in the western Damascus countryside, while ground troops conducted a raid on a village in Quneitra province.

The strikes occurred just days after Israeli fighter jets targeted the Abu al-Duhur military base in northern Syria, causing substantial destruction. Israel claimed the operation was meant to forestall a potential Turkish military deployment at the site, though both Damascus and Ankara contested this rationale. Despite Syrian diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and Washington’s criticism of the Abu al-Duhur strike, the Israeli attacks have continued.

While refraining from direct confrontation, the government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa maintains that Israel must withdraw from occupied Syrian territory and that Damascus retains the right to rebuild its armed forces and pursue partnerships of its choosing.

This situation reveals more than Syria’s military vulnerabilities. It indicates that the new Syrian leadership believes sovereignty can be restored by prioritizing the rebuilding of state capacity. This approach, however, carries significant risks: Israel may continue encroaching on Syrian sovereignty while exploiting Syrian restraint; and the Syrian government may gradually lose credibility among its own citizens and the broader Arab world, where Israel is widely perceived as a threat.

Syria’s weakness is undeniable. Following the collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s military in late 2024, Israel struck strategic military installations throughout the country. The new administration was then forced to construct a national security framework from dysfunctional institutions and a fragmented collection of armed groups.

For the foreseeable future, a Syrian military response capable of changing Israel’s behavior remains difficult to envision.

Instead, al-Sharaa has prioritized economic recovery and international legitimacy. His administration has concentrated on rebuilding state institutions, reforming the security sector, restoring energy infrastructure, improving diplomatic relations and reintegrating Syria into the global economy. Yet rebuilding Syria represents an immense undertaking.

The World Bank estimates that reconstructing Syria’s damaged physical infrastructure will require approximately $216 billion. A state facing needs of this magnitude cannot restore its authority through military institutions alone. It requires revenue, electricity, functional governance, banking access, investment and external partnerships.

Al-Sharaa has made notable progress on the international stage. Washington dismantled the broad Syria sanctions framework in 2025, while the European Union lifted its economic sanctions, although targeted and security-related measures persist. On August 24, Washington also removed Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, removing another significant barrier to financial normalization and investment.

For Damascus, these developments expand the resources available to govern effectively; they represent more than merely an economic benefit of avoiding conflict.

This also renders the dispute with Israel more consequential. Syria’s reconstruction strategy now depends heavily on precisely the international access that years of isolation had denied it. A major military escalation with Israel could undermine investor confidence, complicate Syria’s reintegration into international banking systems and weaken the diplomatic support essential to its recovery.

Such escalation could also expose Damascus to renewed political pressure from Washington and the European Union, even if this does not automatically result in the reimposition of comprehensive sanctions.

The dilemma is therefore becoming increasingly acute: Restraint enables Damascus to preserve the international environment necessary for state reconstruction, but it also provides Israel with room to constrain the very military and strategic capacity Syria is attempting to rebuild.

Israel harbors security concerns regarding the new Syrian government, whose leadership originated from an armed Islamist movement, and is increasingly troubled by Türkiye’s military relationship with Damascus. However, Israeli demands have extended considerably beyond preventing hostile forces from approaching its border.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has advocated for the demilitarization of Syria’s Quneitra, Deraa and Suwayda provinces. His government has also opposed the deployment of Syrian army units south of Damascus and sought to limit the scope of Damascus’s military cooperation with Türkiye.

Israel clearly aims to restrict the rebuilding of Syria’s military capacity, viewing such interference through the lens of preventive security. Damascus perceives the same issue through the lens of sovereignty: A state that cannot determine where its army deploys or with whom it trains has not fully recovered strategic autonomy.

This represents one of the central risks inherent in al-Sharaa’s strategy. Syria is avoiding an unwinnable confrontation partly to rebuild the capacities of state power, while those same capacities are increasingly becoming targets of Israeli pressure.

There are limits to what restraint can accomplish. Syria has the support of other Arab states, while the United States and European Union have backed the reconstruction of a functioning Syrian state as part of their approach to regional stability. Damascus has also repeatedly expressed willingness to pursue a security agreement with Israel.

Nevertheless, none of this has prevented Israeli military action.

The other risk concerns Syrian public opinion. Appearing indefinitely incapable of responding to Israeli attacks could eventually undermine al-Sharaa’s public standing and the legitimacy of his government.

A comprehensive survey conducted by the Arab Center Washington DC in 2025 found that 74 percent of Syrians opposed recognizing Israel, 70 percent rejected any agreement that did not include the return of the Golan Heights, and 88 percent believed Israel threatened Syria’s security and stability. Simultaneously, 61 percent stated that the current government’s foreign policy reflected the views of the Syrian people.

These findings are significant precisely because they complicate the overall picture. The survey predates the latest confrontations and does not indicate whether Syrians favor military retaliation. It establishes political parameters, not a public demand for war.

Broader Arab polling points in the same direction. Across the countries surveyed in the 2025 Arab Opinion Index, opposition to recognizing Israel remained overwhelming.

That said, Syria under the al-Assads also generally avoided confrontation with Israel while maintaining a reputation for belonging to the regional “resistance” camp. The old model combined avoidance of direct war with alliances and armed networks that provided Damascus with regional leverage.

Al-Sharaa’s government appears to be making a different wager, concentrating on consolidated institutions, economic recovery, international access and a rebuilt national military.

This does not replace territorial sovereignty. It represents an attempt to rebuild the means of exercising it.

This strategy will become increasingly difficult to justify, both domestically and internationally, if restored state capacity does not eventually afford Syria greater control over its territory, its security decisions and its foreign relations.

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